ADVANCED PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

Readings for Part 1

Time and Special Relativty

M. Dickson, “Digression: The Block-Universe Argument”, p.165-74, Quantum Chance and Non-Locality, 1998.

M. Dummett, “A Defence of McTaggart's Paradox”, in Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard University Press, 1978.

J. Ellis McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, Mind, 17, p.457, 1908

D. H. Mellor, “The Unreality of Tense”, in The Philosophy of Time, ed. R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath, Oxford University Press, 1993.

H. Putnam, “Time and Physical Geometry”, in Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers Vol.1, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

L. Sklar, “Time, Reality, and Relativity”, in R. Healey, ed., Reduction, Time, and Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

H. Stein, “On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future”, Philosophy of Science, 58, p.147-67, 1991.

H. Stein, “On Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time”, Journal of Philosophy, 65, p.5, 1968.

Reference and the Hole Argument

J. Butterfield, “Albert Einstein meets David Lewis”, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2, 65-81, 1988.

J. Earman, Ch.9, World Enough and Space-Time, MIT Press, 1989

J. Earman and J. Norton, “What Price Substantivalism? The Hole Story”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38, 1987.

M. Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories, p.32-54, Princeton, 1983.

C. Hoefer, “The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism”, Journal of Philosophy, XCIII (1996) 5-27).)]

C. Liu, “Realism and Spacetime: Of Arguments Against Metaphysical Realism and Manifold Realism”, Philosophia Naturalis, 33, 243-63, 1997.

T. Maudlin, “The Essence of Space-Time”, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2, 82-91, 1988.

B. Mundy, “Space-Time and Isomorphism”, PSA Proceedings Vol.2, 515-27 (1992).

H. Putnam, “Introduction”, Realism and Reason, (Phillosophical Papers Vol.3), Cambridge University Press, 1983.

H. Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, Ch. 1. , and Appendix, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

H. Putnam, “Realism Without Absolutes”, Int. J. of Phil. Studies, 1, p.179-92.

W.V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, Ch.II, Harvard University Press, 1990.

W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity”, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, 1969.

C. Rovelli, “What is Observable in Classical and Quantum Gravity”, Classical and Quantum Gravity, 8 (1991): 297-304.

R. Rynasiewicz, `The Lessons of the Hole Argument”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45, 407-36, 1994.

R. Rynasiewicz, “Is There a Syntactic Solution of the Hole Argument?”, Philosophy of Science (Proceedings), 63, S55-62, 1996.

J. Stachel, “The Meaning of General Covariance: the Hole Story”, in J. Earman, A. Janis, G. Massey, and N. Rescher, eds., Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum, Pittsburgh University Press, 1994.

P. Teller, “Substance, Relations, and Arguments about the Nature of Space- Time”, The Philosophical Review, C (1991): 363-97.

Identity of Indiscernibles

H. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, p.20-21, p.26-27, Manchester University Press, 1956.

G. Belot, “The Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Journal of Philosophy, 98, 2001.

M. Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”, Mind, 61, 153-64 (1952)

A. Cortes, “Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles: A False Principle”, Philosophy of Science, 45, 466-70, (1976).

S. French, “Hacking Away at the Identity of Indiscernibles: Possible Worlds and Leibniz’s Principle of Equivalence”, Journal of Philosophy, 91, 455-66, 1995.

S. French and M. Redhead, “Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, 233-46, 1988.

P. Hacking, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”, Journal of Philosophy, 72, 249-56, 1975.

R. Hoy, “Inquiry, Intrinsic Properties, and the Identity of Indiscernibles”, Synthese, 61, 275-97 (1984).

T. Maudlin, “On the Impossibility of David Lewis’ Modal Realism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 669-82, 1996.

W. V. Quine, Word and Object, Sec.47, MIT Press, 1960.

W. V. Quine, Set Theory and Its Logic, Ch.1, Sec.1, Belnap Press, 1961.

W. V. Quine, “Grades of Discriminability”, Journal of Philosophy, 73, (1976); reprinted in Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, 1981.

W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, 2^nd Ed., p. 61-64, Harvard University Press, 1986.

D. Wiggins, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Ch. 6, Oxford University Press, 2001.

Incongruent Counterparts and Parity Violation

M. Curd, (1984), “Showing and Telling; Can the Difference Between Left and Right Be Explained in Words?”, Ratio 26, 63-69; reprinted in The Philosophy of Left and Right, J. Van Cleve and R. Frederick, Kluwer, 1991.

J. Earman, “On the Other Hand..A Reconsideration of Kant, Incongruent Counterparts, and Absolute Space”, in The Philosophy of Left and Right, J. Van Cleve and R. Frederick, Kluwer, 1991.

J. Earman, “Kant, Incongruous Counterparts, and the Nature of Space and Space-Time”, in The Philosophy of Left and Right, J. Van Cleve and R. Frederick, ed., Kluwer, 1991.

C. Hoefer, “Kant’s Hands and Earman’s Pions: Chirality arguments for Substantival Space”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 14, 237-56, 2000.

N. Huggett, “Reflections on Parity Non-Conservation”, Philosophy of Science, 67, 219-41, 2000.

I. Kant, “On the First Ground of the Distinction Between Directions in Space” (1768), in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, D. Walford and R. Meerbote, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1992.

I. Kant, “Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World'” (1770), in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770}, D. Walford and R. Meerbote, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1992.

I. .Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, “Amphiboly and Note to the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection” (especially B319-20, B328), N. Kemp Smith, trans., Macmillan, 1925.