JOHN BROOME: WRITINGS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE TO 21 FEBRUARY 2026
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Philosophy
protects the climate
In The Point Is To Change It, edited by David Archard and Matt
Davies, Nuffield Foundation, 2025, pp. 127–35.
Link to text
The
value of life in the social cost of carbon: a critique and a proposal
Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 15 S1 (2025), pp. 101–26.
In its 2023 revision
of the social cost of carbon, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
values people’s lives on the basis of their willingness to pay for them,
without applying any distributional weights. It justifies this proposal
on grounds of the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, which avoids interpersonal
comparisons of wellbeing. But this criterion was discredited 70 years
ago. Interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing cannot truly be avoided, and
they should be used to determine distributional weights. One way of
doing so is to identify as a numeraire a good that brings equal
wellbeing to each person. A healthy life year is a reasonable, though
only approximate, candidate for such a good. This article presents the
point of view of a philosopher, regarding the practice of economists
from outside the discipline.
Link to text
Utilitarianism
and climate change
A guest essay in Introduction to Utilitarianism: An Online
Textbook, by Richard Chappell, Darius Messner and
William MacKaskill, 2023.
Link to text
Why
not a carbon tax?
Revista de Ciencia Política, 44 (2024), pp. 523–36.
If the world is to
overcome the threat of climate change, a price must be set on carbon. A
carbon tax is a means of creating a carbon price, and it is an ideal tax
in that, unlike most taxes, it promotes economic efficiency. Yet many
countries have no carbon tax. The reason is that there are strong
political interests opposed to taxing carbon. I shall argue that these
interests need to be appeased by fully compensating anyone who would
otherwise be harmed by a carbon tax. This includes the owners and
workers in the fossil fuel industries. If a carbon tax is to be
successful, it needs to be introduced alongside an appropriate system of
compensation. Some of the compensation will need to be paid out of
public debt, and this will be feasible for many countries only if they
are supported by a new financial institution: a World Climate Bank.
Full text
A World Climate Bank
Report published by the Global Challenges Foundation, 2022. Written
with Duncan Foley.
Link to the full report
Review of: Greta Thunberg, No
One is Too Small to Make a Difference
Society, 58 (2021).
Full
text
Climate
change and population ethics
In
The Oxford Handbook of
Population Ethics, edited by Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister
Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns, Oxford
University Press, 2022, pp. 393–406.
We
cannot make good decisions about climate change without taking
account of population ethics.
Draft
Self-interest
against climate change
Lecture given at Stanford University in 2020. Swedish
translation in Klimat och Moral: Nio Tankar om Hetten,
edited by Magnus Linton, Natur & Kultur, 2021.
For more than three decades, the international community has
been trying to bring climate change under control. In effect,
it has been trying to get presently-living people to sacrifice
some of their standard of living for the sake of people in the
future. This effort has failed: emissions of greenhouse gas
are still rising. People seem unwilling to make sacrifices,
and the fossil fuel industry has used its immense power to
prevent governments from taking the necessary actions. We need
a new approach that harnesses people’s self-interest. Economic
theory tells us that, because emissions of greenhouse gas are
an externality, they cause economic inefficiency. This means
it is possible to improve future lives without demanding any
sacrifice from present people. This result can be achieved by
setting a price on carbon in order to internalize the
externality, and using redistributive financial transfers to
compensate people for paying the carbon price. Owners of
fossil fuels can be bought out so that it is no longer in
their interests to prevent action on climate change. That is
the theory. To put it into effect, the cost of decarbonization
will have to be paid for partly by public borrowing, which is
a way of redistributing resources from the future people who
will benefit from decarbonization to the present people who
have to bear the costs. Undoubtedly some injustice and
maldistribution will result, but for the sake of controlling
climate change it must be tolerated.
Draft
Philosophy in the IPCC
Against
denialism
The Monist, 102 (2019)
This paper opposes individualism denialism, which is the view that an
individual does no harm by her emissions of greenhouse gas. The argument
is that science has shown that on a large scale there is an increasing
linear relationship between emissions and global average temperature, and
increasing temperature does harm. Because at a small scale the climate
system contains a lot of randomness, not all emissions do harm, but each
emission leads to an increase in expected harm. This paper reviews a
number of contrary arguments. Among them is the argument that the effect
of climate change is overdetermined; it is caused by the actions of
everyone together, and one person’s refraining from emitting would make no
difference. Another is an argument that the effect of an individual is
imperceptible, and there can be no imperceptible harm. The paper answers
all these arguments.
Published
version Copy
in journal
A
challenge for the world: take notice of economics
In a Festschrift for Ottmar Edenhofer, 2018.
Text
Efficiency
and future generations
Economics
and Philosophy, 34 (2018), pp. 221–41.
Standard
lessons from economics tell us that an externality creates
inefficiency, and that this inefficiency can be removed by
internalizing the externality. This paper considers how
successfully these lessons can be extended to intergenerational
externalities such as emissions of greenhouse gas. For
intergenerational externalities, the standard lessons involve
comparisons between states whose populations of people differ,
either in their identities or their numbers. Common notions of
efficiency break down in these comparisons. This paper supplies
a new notion of efficiency that allows the lessons to survive,
but at the cost of reducing their practical significance.
Preprint
Published
version
Trump and climate change
The Philosophers' Magazine, 76 (2017)
Preprint
A World Climate Bank
In Institutions for Future Generations, edited by Axel Gosseries
and Iñigo González-Ricoy, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 156-69
Written with Duncan Foley
Because greenhouse gas is an externality, it creates Pareto inefficiency.
It is therefore possible to respond to climate change in a way that is a
Pareeto improvement, requiring no sacrifice from anyone in any generation.
A great deal of benefit can be achieved by doing so. However, making a
Pareto improvement in practice requires a new international financial
institution. We need a World Climate Bank, which will allow investments to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to be financed by public debt.
Text
Do not ask for morality
In The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics, edited by
Adrian Walsh, Säde Hormio and Duncan Purves, Routledge, 2016, pp. 9-21.
Experience has shown that governments cannot be motivated by morality to
make sufficient investments to bring climate change under control. They
therefore must be motivated by self interest. It is possible to respond
adequately to climate change without asking for a sacrifice from anyone in
any generation.
Published
version
A reply to my critics
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 40 (2016), pp. 158-171
A response to three comments on my Climate Matters. In
responding to Elizabeth Cripps, I argue that each individual’s emissions
do harm because the harm done by cumulative emissions is roughly
proportional to their quantity. Each rich person’s emissions are therefore
an injustice. In responding to Holly Lawford-Smith, I point out that the
harm done by each tonne of a person’s emissions is very much greater than
the cost to the person of avoiding that emission, so very few among the
rich have any excuse for making emissions. In response to Paul Bou-Habib,
I argue that the morality of climate change has no need for a
‘person-affecting’ notion of improvement, and that notion is in any case
defective because it can be cyclical.
Published version Journal page
Climate change and the ethics of
population
In Demography and Climate Change, edited by Franz Prettenthaler,
Lukas Meyer and Wolfgang Polt, Joanneum Research, 2015, pp. 37-43
Proof
Climate change: life and death
In Climate Change and Justice, edited by Jeremy Moss, Cambridge
University Press, 2015, pp. 184-200
Full text
A
philosopher at the IPCC
The Philosophers' Magazine, 66 (2014), pp. 10-16
A shorter version appears on the blog of The London Review of Books
Published version
The
public
and private morality of climate change
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 32, (2013), pp. 3-20
Translation in Foreign Theoretical Trends (China), forthcoming
Full text (including the diagram, which was omitted
from printed version)
The
most
important thing about climate change
In Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters, edited by Jonathan
Boston, Andrew Bradstock and David Eng, ANU E Press, 2010, pp. 101-16
Full text
Should we value population?
Journal of Political Philosophy, 13 (2005), pp. 399-413
Reprinted in Population and Political Theory: Philosophy,
Politics and Society 8th Series, edited by James Fishkin
and Robert Goodin, Wiley-Blackwell 2010
Reprinted in The Study of Ethics, Southeast University Press,
2007, pp. 3-21
Full text
The
ethics
of climate change
Scientific American, June 2008, pp 69-73
Reprinted in The Best American Science and Nature Writing, 2008,
edited by Tim Folger and Elizabeth Kolbert, Houghton Mifflin, 2009, pp.
11-18
Reprinted in Research Ethics: A Philosophical Approach to
Responsible Conduct of Research, edited by Gary Comstock,
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 265-9
Full text
Valuing
policies
in response to climate change: some ethical issues
(Report written for the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change,
2006)
Published on the UK Treasury website.
Reprinted in Global Justice, edited by Christian Barry and
Holly Lawford-Smith, Ashgate Publishing, 2012
Preprint
Counting the Cost of Global
Warming
White Horse Press, 1992
Full
text
of book
Writing for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Contributions to the Fifth Assessment Report:
Chapter
3: Social,
economic and ethical concepts and methods (Lead Author)
Link
Technical Summary
(Lead Author) Link
Summary for Policymakers
(Drafting Author) Link
All in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change,
Cambridge University Press, 2014. (The report of Working Group III.)
Synthesis Report, IPCC, 2014 (Member of the Core Writing Team) Link