Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948

Session 2: 

The Hashemite Connection

The weakest link in the chain of hostile Arab states that surrounded the Yishuv on all sides was Transjordan. Ever since the creation of the Amirate of Transjordan by Britain in 1921, the Jewish Agency strove to cultivate friendly relations with its Hashemite ruler, ‘Abdullah ibn Husayn. The irreconcilable conflict between the Jewish and Arab national movements in Palestine provided the setting for the emergence of the special relations between the Zionists and ‘Abdullah, who became king in 1946 when Transjordan gained formal independence. Failure to reach an understanding with their Palestinian neighbors spurred the Zionist leaders to seek a counterweight to local hostility in better relations with the neighboring Arab countries. Indeed, the attempt to bypass the Palestine Arabs and forge links with the rulers of the Arab states became a central feature of Zionist diplomacy in the 1930s and 1940s.

The friendship between the Hashemite ruler and the Zionist movement was cemented by a common enemy in the shape of the grand mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the leader of the Palestinian national movement. For the mufti had not only put his forces on a collision course with the Jews; he was also ‘Abdullah's principal rival for control over Palestine. Both sides perceived Palestinian nationalism as a threat and therefore had a common interest in suppressing it. From the Zionist point of view, ‘Abdullah was an immensely valuable ally. First and foremost, he was the only Arab ruler who was prepared to accept the partition of Palestine and to live in peace with a Jewish state after the conflict had been settled. Second, his small army, the Arab Legion, was the best trained and most professional of the armies of the Arab states. Third, ‘Abdullah and his aides and agents were a source of information about the other Arab countries involved in the Palestine problem. Last but not least, through ‘Abdullah the Zionists could generate mistrust, foment rivalry, and leak poison to weaken the coalition of their Arab adversaries. 

In 1947, as the conflict over Palestine entered the crucial stage, the contacts between the Jewish side and King ‘Abdullah intensified. Golda Meir of the Jewish Agency had a secret meeting with ‘Abdullah in Naharayim on 17 November 1947. At this meeting they reached a preliminary agreement to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies, to forestall the mufti, and to endeavor to prevent the other Arab states from intervening directly in Palestine. Twelve days later, on 29 November, the United Nations pronounced its verdict in favor of dividing the area of the British mandate into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. This made it possible to firm up the tentative understanding reached at Naharayim. In return for ‘Abdullah's promise not to enter the area assigned by the UN to the Jewish state, the Jewish Agency agreed to the annexation by Transjordan of most of the area earmarked for the Arab state. Precise borders were not drawn and Jerusalem was not even discussed as under the UN plan it was to remain a corpus separatum under international control. Nor was the agreement ever put down in writing. The Jewish Agency tried to tie ‘Abdullah down to a written agreement but he was evasive. Yet, according to Yaacov Shimoni, a senior official in the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, despite ‘Abdullah's evasions, the understanding with him was:

entirely clear in its general spirit. We would agree to the conquest of the Arab part of Palestine by ‘Abdullah. We would not stand in his way. We would not help him, would not seize it and hand it over to him. He would have to take it by his own means and stratagems but we would not disturb him. He, for his part, would not prevent us from establishing the state of Israel, from dividing the country, taking our share and establishing a state in it. Now his vagueness, his ambiguity, consisted of declining to write anything, to draft anything which would bind him. To this he did not agree. But to the end, until the last minute, he always said again and again: "perhaps you would settle for less than complete independence and statehood, for full autonomy, or a Jewish canton under the roof of the Hashemite crown." He did try to raise this idea every now and again and, of course, always met with a blank wall. We told him we were talking about complete, full, and total independence and are not prepared to discuss anything else. And to this he seemed resigned but without ever saying: "OK, an independent state." He did not say that, he did not commit himself, he was not precise. But such was the spirit of the agreement and it was totally unambiguous.  

Incidentally, the agreement included a provision that if 'Abdullah succeeded in capturing Syria, and realized his dream of Greater Syria--something we did not think he had the power to do--we would not disturb him. We did not believe either in the strength of his faction in Syria. But the agreement included a provision that if he did accomplish it, we would not stand in his way. But regarding the Arab part of Palestine, we did think it was serious and that he had every chance of taking it, all the more so since the Arabs of Palestine, with their official leadership, did not want to establish a state at all. That meant that we were not interfering with anybody. It was they who refused. Had they accepted a state, we might not have entered into the conspiracy. I do not know. But the fact was that they refused, so there was a complete power vacuum here and we agreed that he will go in and take the Arab part, provided he consented to the establishment of our state and to a joint declaration that there will be peaceful relations between us and him after the dust settles. That was the spirit of the agreement. A text did not exist.

Neutralizing the Arab Liberation Army

King ‘Abdullah was the Zionists' principal vehicle for fomenting further tension and antagonism within the ranks of the conflict-ridden Arab coalition, but he was not the only one. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army, was another weak link in the chain of hostile Arab forces. The first companies of the ALA started infiltrating into Palestine in January 1948 while Qawuqji himself did not arrive until March. Qawuqji's anti-Husayni political orientation provided an opportunity for a dialogue across the battle lines that were rapidly taking shape in Palestine as the British mandate was approaching its inglorious end.

Yehoshua ("Josh") Palmon was one of the Haganah's ablest intelligence officers and a fluent Arabic speaker. From close observation of factional Arab politics, Palmon was aware of the bitter grudge which Qawuqji bore the mufti. In 1947 Palmon discovered wartime German documents bearing on this feud and he passed them on to Qawuqji. These documents confirmed Qawuqji's suspicion that it was the mufti who had instigated his arrest and incarceration by the German authorities. Qawuqji expressed a desire to meet Palmon but, on being appointed to command the ALA, he dropped the idea. From officers who arrived in Palestine before their chief, however, Palmon learnt that Qawuqji was not hell-bent on fighting the Jews. He apparently realized that such a war would be neither short nor easy and he was said to be open to suggestions for averting it. 

airman of the Jewish Agency Executive, approved Palmon's plan for a secret meeting to try and persuade Qawuqji to keep out of the fight between the Haganah and the mufti's forces provided no promises were made to limit their own freedom of action to retaliate against any armed gangs. Palmon went to see Qawuqji at the latter's headquarters in the village of Nur al-Shams on 1 April. After a great deal of beating about the bush, Palmon got down to the real business of the meeting which was to turn inter-Arab rivalries to the advantage of his side. A solution could have been found to the problem of Palestine, he said, had it not been for the mufti. Qawuqji launched into a diatribe against the mufti's wicked ambitions, violent methods, and selfish lieutenants. When Palmon mentioned ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the mufti's cousin, and Hasan Salama, Qawuqji interjected that they could not count on any help from him and, indeed, he hoped that the Jews would teach them a good lesson. Palmon then suggested that the Haganah and the ALA should refrain from attacking each other and plan instead to negotiate, following the departure of the British. Qawuqji agreed but explained frankly that he needed to score one military victory in order to establish his credentials. Palmon could not promise to hand him a victory on a silver plate. If Jews were attacked, he said, they would fight back. Nevertheless, he went away with a clear impression that Qawuqji would remain neutral in the event of a Jewish attack on the mufti's forces in Palestine.http://www.cambridge.org/

The extent of Palmon's success in neutralizing the ALA became clear only as events unfolded. On 4 April the Haganah launched Operation Nahshon to open the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road which had been blocked by the Palestinian irregulars. First, Hasan Salama's headquarters in Ramla was blown up. Although an ALA contingent with heavy guns was present in the neighborhood, it did not go to the rescue. Qawuqji was as good (or as bad) as his word to Palmon. Next was the battle for the Qastal, a strategic point overlooking the road to Jerusalem, which changed hands several times amid fierce fighting. ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni telephoned Qawuqji to ask for an urgent supply of arms and ammunition to beat off the Jewish offensive. Thanks to the Arab League, Qawuqji had large stocks of war material but, according to the Haganah listening post which monitored the call, he replied that he had none. ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni himself was killed in the battle for Qastal on 9 April. He was by far the ablest and most charismatic of the mufti's military commanders and his death marked the collapse of the Husayni forces in Palestine.

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