Online Appendix – Supplementary Information
"Democracy and Retribution: Transitional Justice and Regime Support in Post-War West Germany"
Comparative Political Studies, **2019**

Giovanni Capoccia (Oxford) and Grigore Pop-Eleches (Princeton)

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1. <u>Data and Variables</u>

Table A1 – *Denazification conviction statistics by Land*

Land	Zone	Major offenders+ offenders[a]		Lesser offenders[b]		Fellow travelers[c]	
		% pop	Number	% pop	Number	% pop	Number
Schleswig-Holstein	British	0.02	627	0.13	1170	2.51	66500
Hamburg	British	0.02	337	0.12	628	1.06	15052
Niedersachsen	British	0.02	1521	0.05	2839	0.63	40250
Nordrhein-Westfalen	British	0.02	2789	0.24	5206	0.85	100226
Bremen	US	0.08	394	0.17	815	3.01	14640
Hessen	US	0.14	5766	0.69	28208	3.29	133722
Bayern	US	0.13	11783	0.59	52940	2.39	215585
Württemberg-Baden	US	0.16	5833	0.67	24459	3.30	121110
Rheinland-Pfalz	French	0.02	445	0.18	4840	5.72	157952
Baden	French	0.03	393	0.89	10653	7.55	90486
Württemberg-Hohenzollern	French	0.01	113	0.12	1333	4.50	50351
Saarland[d]	French	0.02	179	0.33	3165	5.88	56194
Berlin[e]	Int'l	0.08	1590	0.42	8530	2.92	59079

Notes:

a. Data for US and French zone from Vollnhals (1991:33); for British zone from Wember (1991:318)
b. Data for US and French zone from Vollnhals; for British zone from Vollnhals (1991:33) and Wember (1991:318)
c. Data for all three zones from Vollnhals (1991:33)
d. Since no detailed conviction statistics were available for Saarland, we used average conviction rates for the French zone (cite). However, Saarland was only included in the 1957 survey, since it only joined West Germany in 1956. Our findings do not change if Saarland is excluded from the analysis.
e. Conviction rates for Berlin were calculated as population-weighed averages of the three zones, since detailed conviction statistics were not available (and the 1957 survey, which was the only one to include Berlin residents, did not specify which sector of Berlin respondents were living in.) Our findings do not change if Berlin is excluded from the analysis.

Table A2 -- Categories of guilt and sanction (Directive N. 38 of Control Council, 12 October 1946, Part II, Articles 1-13)[1]

Category	Criteria for inclusion	Main possible sanctions
Major offenders (*Hauptschuldige*)	Perpetration of political crimes or acts of brutality on behalf of the regime; Holding of leading positions in the NSDAP or any Nazi organizations, as well as in the administration of the *Reich*, *Länder* and occupied areas; Active engagement in or collaboration with the Gestapo, SS and similar police organizations; Members of the High Command of the Armed Forces	Up to 10 years of imprisonment; full requisitioning of property; loss of political rights (electability and vote); loss of rights to a public pension; restriction of rights of residence; prohibition for 10 years to engage in anything else than "common work".
Offenders (*Belastete*)	Offenders included "Activists", "Militarists" and "Profiteers", each defined broadly. Criteria ranged from supporting Nazism in public or in education; perpetrating or advocating violence against opponents of Nazism; abusing office as a judge or prosecutor; advocating militarism or the domination of other peoples; having any undue advantage (including promotions to any office or position) deriving from NSDAP membership; profiteering from arms' trade or occupation of foreign territories. *De facto*, these criteria allowed for inclusion in this category all lower officials of the Nazi organizations, all members of the NSDAP before May 1937, and all members of the Waffen-SS and the SS. The further criterion of responsibility for the "devastation of cities and country places" after the Allies' invasion of Germany allowed the inclusion of high army officers.	Up to 10 years labor camp; partial or full requisition of property; loss of political rights (electability and vote); loss of rights to a public pension; restriction of right of leaving their occupation zone; prohibition for 5 years to engage in anything else than "common work".
Lesser Offenders (*Minderbelastete*)	Anyone (including former members of the Armed Forces) who would be classifiable as an Offender but "because of special circumstances seems worthy of a milder judgement and can be expected according to his character to fulfil his duties as a citizen of a peaceful democratic state after … a period of probation" (Art. 4.I.1) This was presumed of anybody born after 1/1/1919, and anybody who withdrew from Nazism "at an early time" (as long as not classifiable as major offenders) Anyone who would be classifiable as a Fellow Traveler "…but because of his conduct and in view of his character will first have to prove himself" (Art. 4.I.2)	Probation for two to three years, after which they will be classified as Offenders or Fellow Travelers on the basis of their conduct. During probation: prohibition to own, operate, supervise or acquire any enterprise of more than 20 employees; to work as a teacher, author, preacher, radio commentator, or to exercise an independent profession; confiscation of any property acquired via political connection or measures such as aryanization; if civil servants, partial loss of salary or pension and demotion; discretionary restrictions to freedom of movement and political rights.
"Fellow Travelers" ("Followers") (*Mitläufer*)	Being no more than "a nominal participant in, or a supporter of" the Nazi regime. This included mainly those members of the NSDAP who did no more than pay membership duties, attend compulsory meetings, and carry out routine tasks, as well as those former members of the Armed forces who, in the opinion of a Zone Commander, could "endanger Allied purposes".	At the discretion of the Zone Commander: report periodically to the police; leaving their Zone subject to permission; loss of electability to public office (but not of right to vote); if civil servants, partial loss of salary or pension, and demotion; one-off or running payment to a common reparation fund.
Exonerated persons (*Entlastete*)	Those who, although incriminated, could prove their innocence, as well as those who, even though they may have formally belonged to a Nazi organization, could prove that they actively resisted the Nazi regime within their possibilities, and that they were disadvantaged by such actions.	N/A

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[1] See the full text of the directive in Ruhm von Oppen (1995).

Table A3 – Index of procedural fairness: components, operationalization, data sources

Dimension of procedural fairness	Definition	Measure
Quality of decisions	Did authorities get the information they needed to make good decisions?	Individualized guilt as opposed to automatic attribution of guilt
Ethicality	Had authorities shown concern for respondents' rights?	"Common work" requirement for length of denazification proceedings
Correctability	Did respondents know of any "agency or organization" to which they could have complained about unfair treatment?	Actual possibility of reversing or correcting initial sentences
Control/representation	"Process control" - opportunity to present case to the authorities before decisions were made. "Decision control" - how much influence respondents had over decisions	Length of time in which *Spruchkammern* were operational
Impartiality	Bias: Was treatment or outcome influenced by their "race, sex, age, nationality, or some other characteristic of them as a person"?	Universal imposition of questionnaires
	Dishonesty: Did authorities do anything "improper or dishonest"?	No systematic information on subnational variation
	Effort to be fair: How hard had the police or judge tried to show fairness?	No systematic information on subnational variation

Dimensions of procedural fairness are drawn from Tyler (1988)

We build a measure of procedural fairness based on the dimensions in the table above. Each component is weighed equally and added to form the index. Below we briefly discuss our operationalization strategies and data sources.

"Quality of decisions": we consider whether military authorities adopted a collective and automatic conception of guilt – by which belonging to a certain organization (e.g. the NSDAP) or having a certain professional position (e.g. public employee) was considered an automatic indicator of guilt – or whether they considered each individual case on its own merits. The US and the UK authorities adopted the former conception, while the French authorities adopted the latter (e.g. Biddiscombe 2007, 158). We score this dimension dichotomously.

"Ethicality": Our indicator – whether the defendant in a denazification trial was prohibited from engaging in anything else than "common work" (an expression by which the legislation meant forms of manual or low-level subordinate labor) for the whole duration of the proceedings – similarly sets apart the *Länder* of the French zone from those of the other two. The French military authorities, in fact, explicitly rejected art. 58 of the *Befreiungsgesetz* where such prohibition was included. The article in question was instead applied in the other two zones (Vollnhals 1991, 41). We score this dimension dichotomously.

"Correctability": Procedures adopted in the *Länder* of the French zones also stand out from those occupied by British and American forces in terms of "Correctability". While the verdicts issued by the *Spruchkammern* could in principle be appealed in all zones, in the French zone the possibility of reversing previous judgment was enhanced by the fact that the *Spruchkammern*, once introduced, did not try new cases. Instead, *Spruchkammern* in the French zone concentrated on reviewing denazification decisions

that had been taken in the earlier phase of the occupation, in many cases overturning prior decisions of conviction or demoting individuals to lower categories of guilt (Grohnert 1991, 205-207). We score this dimension dichotomously.

"Control/Representation": For this dimension we adopt a continuous measure, corresponding to the number of months between May 1945 and August 1949[2] in which each *Land* had a quasi-judicial system in place, staffed by Germans, in which defendants had the right to be heard and the evidence they brought influenced the decision (essentially, the *Spruchkammern* system that we describe in the paper). As explained in the main paper, the different zones switched to the *Spruchkammern* system from previous denazification regimes. These earlier regimes varied slightly across *Länder* and zones, and were partially reformed at different points in time, but all of them shared the fundamental characteristics that military authorities had more power and defendants generally had no right to be heard. Even though in some cases (in the French zone, and the UK zone for the higher categories of guilt) military authorities formally retained the power of final decision even when *Spruchkammern* were empaneled, *de facto* they hardly used those powers.

To normalize our measure of "Control/Representation", we divide the number of months in which *Spruchkammern* were operational[3] by the maximum number of months, among all *Länder*, in which the system was in place (forty-two months in all US zone *Länder*). The scores for different *Länder* range from 0.52 to 1. We have no information on West-Berlin, which we score as a weighted average of the average scores of the three zones.

Table A3.1—Control/Representation procedural justice dimension in the Western *Länder*

Land	Zone	*Spruchkammern* system in force during:
Schleswig-Holstein	UK	Nov 47-Aug 49
Hamburg	UK	May 47-Aug 49
Niedersachsen	UK	Nov 47-Aug 49
Nordrhein-Westfalen	UK	Nov 47-Aug 49
Bremen	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Hessen	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Württemberg-Baden	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Bayern	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Rheinland-Pfalz	F	Oct 47-Aug 49
Baden	F	Oct 47-Aug 49
Württemberg-Hohenzollern	F	Oct 47-Aug 49
Saarland	F	May 47-Aug 49

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[2] The start and end of this time span are given respectively by the capitulation of the *Reich* in May 1945 to the month before the creation of the Federal Republic in September 1949, competencies on denazification were passed to the *Länder* administrations (our conviction data are also recorded at 31 August 1949, see Fig. 1 in main paper). The starting date is strictly speaking not entirely accurate as several Western areas of the *Reich* were occupied earlier as the Allied troops advanced through Germany. Lacking information on the exact period of occupation of different regions before the *Reich* capitulation, of how such regions would map onto post-1945 *Land* boundaries, and on whether such territories were occupied by US or UK troops, we chose to focus on May 1945 as a starting point to measure this index component.
[3] This might differ slightly from when the system was formally approved. For example, in Baden the new system was formally introduced in March 1947, and in Rheinland-Pfalz and Württemberg-Hohenzollern in April 1947, but in all three *Länder* the *Spruchkammern* became operational only in October of the same year (Vollnhals 1991, 40)

"Impartiality": Tyler identifies three sub-dimensions of "Impartiality": "Bias", "Dishonesty", and "Effort to be fair". We have no information on the latter two in the case of denazification in Western Germany. Regarding "Bias", one way to capture whether authorities attributed guilt on the basis of individual characteristics such as nationality is to consider their policies on the administration of questionnaires to potential defendants. In the US zone, all Germans above 18 years of age were obliged to compile a questionnaire on their activities during the Nazi regime, which would then constitute the basis for potential prosecution. In the French and the UK zones, instead, similar questionnaires were used only for individuals in senior positions in the public administration, thus linking the presumption of guilt not to nationality (and age) as such but to the function that the individuals had exerted in the Nazi regime. This measure sets the US zone apart from the other two. We score this dimension dichotomously.

Table A4. Survey question wording for dependent variables

Survey year	Variable number	English translation	German original
1953	V0256	Do you think that it's better to have one party, multiple parties, or no parties? (If "multiple parties": About how many?)	Glauben Sie, dass es besser ist, wenn es eine Partei, mehrere Parteien oder keine Partei gibt? (Falls "mehrere": Wieviel Parteien etwa?)
1955	V0006	Here is an opinion that is sometimes expressed by people. Would you tell me whether you agree with this opinion or not? We should once again have a single strong national party that really represents the interests of all the different layers/stratums of our people.	Hier ist eine Ansicht, wie sie manchmal von Leuten ausgesprochen wird. Wuerden sie mir sagen ob sie dieser Ansicht zustimmen oder nicht? Wir sollten wieder eine einzige starke nationale Partei haben, die wirklich die Interessen aller Schichten unseres Volkes vertritt.
1957	V467	Do you think that it's better for our country to have one party, so there is as much unity as possible, or multiple parties, so that the different opinions can be freely represented?[a]	Glauben sie, dass es fuer unser Land besser ist, eine Partei zu haben, damit moeglichst grosse Einigkeit herrscht, oder mehrere Parteien, damit die verschiedenen Meinungen frei vertreten werden koennen?
1957	V184	If we look at it from a purely practical side: Do we really need a Parliament and all those deputies in Bonn, or could we do without them?[a]	Wenn man das einmal ganz von der nuetzlichen Seite betrachtet: Brauchen wir in Bonn denn ein Parlament und lauter Abgeordnete, oder ginge es auch ohne?
1957	V241	Two men talk about how one should rule a country. - The first one says: I like it best when the people put the best politician in charge and transfer him all the governing power. With a few chosen experts he can then decide clearly and quickly. There is not much talking and things would get done. -The other one says: I like it better when more people get to decide something in the state. Sometimes things have to go back and forth until something gets done but it cannot happen as easily that the governing power gets misused (abused). Which of these two opinions comes closer to your own opinion – the first or the second?[a]	Zwei Männer unterhalten sich darüber, wie man ein Land regieren soll. - Der eine sagt: Mir gefällt es am besten wenn das Volk den besten Politiker an die Spitze stellt und ihm die ganze Regierungsgewalt überträgt. Der kann dann mit ein paar ausgesuchten Fachleuten klar und schnell entscheiden. Es wird nicht viel geredet und es geschieht wirklich was. - Der andere sagt: Mir ist es lieber. wenn mehrere Leute etwas im Staat zu bestimmen haben. Da geht es zwar manchmal hin und her bis was getan wird, aber es kann nicht so leicht vorkommen. daß die Regierungsgewalt missbraucht wird. Welche dieser beiden Meinungen kommt Ihrer eigenen Ansicht am nächsten - die erste oder die zweite?
1957	V242	Let's assume that a new National Socialist party tries to come to power: how would you react? Here are the different possibilities: 1. I would applaud it and would support such a party 2. I would applaud it but not do anything special about it 3. I would be indifferent 4. I would be opposed but not do anything special about it 5. I would do everything I could so that something like that does not happen.[a]	Angenommen, eine neue Nationalsozialistische Partei versucht, an die Macht zu kommen: Wie wuerden Sie sich da verhalten? Hier sind die verschiedenen Moeglichkeiten: 1. Ich wuerde es begruessen und wuerde eine solche Partei unterstuetzen 2. Ich wuerde es begruessen aber nichts besonders dafuer tun 3. Waere mir egal 4. Ich waere dagegen, aber wuerde nichts besonders tun 5. Ich wuerde alles tun, was ich koennte, damit so etwas nicht passiert

a. Since the four questions from the 1957 survey included a "don't know" and/or "undecided" option (accounting for up to 20% of answers), in constructing the democracy index (discussed in fn.27 in the main manuscript) we created two sets of dummies for each variable, coded 1 for each of the two main opposing answers and 0 for all other options. Doing so reduces the data loss and potential bias resulting from excluding respondents answering "don't know" or "undecided" without making strong assumptions about the nature of these non-responses.

Table A5. Summary statistics for 1953 survey

Variable	N	mean	sd	min	max
Opposed to one party regime	2523	0.73	0.44	0	1
Refugee	2523	0.22	0.41	0	1
Protestant	2523	0.49	0.50	0	1
Catholic	2523	0.47	0.50	0	1
Other religion	2523	0.01	0.10	0	1
Male	2523	0.49	0.50	0	1
Single	2523	0.19	0.39	0	1
Widowed	2523	0.10	0.30	0	1
Divorced	2523	0.02	0.14	0	1
Middle maturity education[1]	2523	0.10	0.30	0	1
High school education	2523	0.04	0.20	0	1
University education	2523	0.02	0.13	0	1
Agricultural occupation	2523	0.08	0.27	0	1
Worker	2523	0.22	0.42	0	1
Pensioner	2523	0.10	0.30	0	1
Self-employed	2523	0.09	0.28	0	1
Unemployed	2523	0.04	0.20	0	1
Homemaker	2523	0.31	0.46	0	1

[1] Mittlere Reife ("Middle maturity") is a form of high school degree, often completed after ten years of schooling, which typically does not quality students to attend university without getting an Abitur (baccalaureate) first.

Table A6. Summary Statistics for 1955 Survey

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Opposed to one party regime	1479	0.63	0.48	0	1
Refugee	1479	0.16	0.37	0	1
Protestant	1479	0.52	0.50	0	1
Catholic	1479	0.44	0.50	0	1
Other religion	1479	0.01	0.12	0	1
Male	1479	0.48	0.50	0	1
Single	1479	0.17	0.37	0	1
Widowed	1479	0.10	0.30	0	1
Divorced	1479	0.03	0.16	0	1
Middle maturity education	1479	0.13	0.34	0	1
High school education	1479	0.03	0.16	0	1
University education	1479	0.02	0.13	0	1
Agricultural occupation	1479	0.07	0.25	0	1
Worker	1479	0.25	0.43	0	1
Pensioner	1479	0.08	0.28	0	1
Self-employed	1479	0.07	0.26	0	1
Unemployed	1479	0.03	0.18	0	1
Homemaker	1479	0.33	0.47	0	1

Table A7. Summary Statistics for 1957 Survey

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Opposed to one party regime	1953	0.88	0.33	0	1
Democracy index	1956	0.32	0.26	-0.43	0.6
Denazification target	1941	0.12	0.32	0	1
Newspaper reading frequency	1948	3.82	1.62	0	5
Radio listening frequency	1827	4.07	1.35	1	6
Many acquaintances	1925	0.42	0.49	0	1
Frequently goes bowling	1296	0.09	0.29	0	1
Refugee	1956	0.22	0.42	0	1
Protestant	1956	0.53	0.50	0	1
Catholic	1956	0.40	0.49	0	1
Other religion	1956	0.02	0.12	0	1
Male	1956	0.47	0.50	0	1
Single	1956	0.21	0.40	0	1
Widowed	1956	0.09	0.28	0	1
Divorced	1956	0.02	0.15	0	1
Middle maturity education	1956	0.16	0.37	0	1
High school education	1956	0.04	0.20	0	1
University education	1956	0.01	0.11	0	1
Agricultural occupation	1956	0.10	0.30	0	1
Worker	1956	0.29	0.46	0	1
Pensioner	1956	0.10	0.30	0	1
Self-employed	1956	0.07	0.25	0	1
Unemployed	1956	0.01	0.08	0	1
Homemaker	1956	0.26	0.44	0	1

Table A8. Table Summary Statistics for Land-level Variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Offender convictions (%)	13	0.06	0.05	0.010	0.159
Lesser Offender convictions (%)	13	0.35	0.27	0.054	0.889
Fellow Traveler convictions (%)	13	3.35	2.08	0.626	7.554
Procedural index	13	2.30	1.55	1.000	4.548
Refugee share	13	0.14	0.09	0.008	0.330
NSDAP vote share July 1932	13	0.84	1.76	0.262	6.700
NSDAP vote share Nov 1932	13	0.80	1.77	0.206	6.700
Unemployment 1952	12	0.10	0.08	0.027	0.284
Unemployment 1954	13	0.07	0.05	0.021	0.195
Unemployment 1956	13	0.03	0.02	0.012	0.095
Letters to *Der Stuermer* (per 10k)	12	1.64	3.68	0.258	13.301
Total internments (%)	13	0.37	0.11	0.293	0.522
Internments post-January 1947	13	0.20	0.06	0.151	0.280
Death sentences per 100K	13	1.47	0.31	1.048	1.776
Relative popularity of zone troops	13	14.68	26.31	-21.000	42.000
Far right license 1949	13	0.46	0.52	0	1
CP vote share 1946-47 *Land* elections	13	8.99	2.99	4.7	14.0

Note: While we have aggregate data for up to 13 post-WWII German *Länder*, respondents from Saarland were only included in the 1957 survey, since Saarland was not incorporated into Germany until January 1, 1957. The 1953 survey did not include respondents from Berlin. Finally, only the 1955 survey allowed us to take advantage of the distinction within Baden-Württemberg between Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern in the French zone and Württemberg-Baden in the US zone.[4]

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[4] While the 1957 also contained a variable distinguishing between North (US) and South (French) Baden-Württemberg, it was not included for the entire sample and was not available in the questionnaire versions where the regime questions were asked.

Survey technical details

For the Allensbach 1953 Election Survey a detailed methodological report is available at the GESIS Data Archive (https://dbk.gesis.org/DBKSearch/download.asp?db=E&id=44226). The survey used a three-stage random sampling approach, with localities stratified by *Land*, *Regierungsbezirk*, and the proportion of the Catholic population. The probability of any locality being selected was proportional to the size of its population. This process resulted in the selection of 152 sampling points in 136 localities. Within sampling points individual households were selected based on *Einwohnermeldekarteien* (local residential registries), with the chance of selection proportional to the size of the household. Within a given household, adult respondents (aged 18-79) were chosen by random draw.

The methodological report for the 1953 survey also includes detailed information about response rates and reasons for non-response. Overall response rate was very high (83.8%), and refusals accounted for only 8.6% of all individuals contacted. Both of these figures are reassuring about the representativeness of the survey sample. Furthermore, they suggest that even as early as 1953 the vast majority of German citizens were not afraid to answer political questions as part of a public opinion survey, which should alleviate concerns about the extent to which responses may be biased by fears of possible political repercussions.[5]

Similarly detailed methodological reports were not available for the other two surveys we used in this manuscript. However, we know that like in the 1953 Allensbach survey, the interviews were conducted in person at the respondents' residence. The USIA 1955 survey was based on a multi-stage random sample while the Allensbach 1957 was based on a quota sample of residents aged 16 and older but unfortunately no additional information was provided about sampling methods. While this lack of more detailed information about sampling procedures creates some uncertainty about the comparability of the three survey samples analyzed in this manuscript, the fact that we get fairly consistent results across these different surveys provides greater confidence in the robustness of our results. (The potential cross-survey sample differences rooted in different sampling procedures would be more problematic if our argument relied on explaining differences in statistical results across different surveys.)

For more details about the USIA 1955 survey, see https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=0447&search=ZA 0447&search2=&field=all&field2=&DB=d&tab=0&notabs=&nf=1&af=&ll=10.

For the Allensbach 1957 survey, see https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=3272&search=allensbach 1957&search2=&field=all&field2=&DB=d&tab=0&notabs=&nf=1&af=&ll=10.

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[5] Even though the available data do not allow us to estimate desirability bias for these surveys, ample survey evidence from the same years suggests that a majority of respondents had no qualms in expressing principled support for Nazism as a "good idea badly carried out."(Merritt 1995:97). Furthermore, despite the potential sensitivity of these issues in the early postwar years, response rate was high: in 1953 only 8.6% of respondents refused to answer the question about the optimal number of political parties.

2. <u>Robustness tests and alternative specifications</u>

Table A9: Multi-level analysis of Table 1 results (Denazification outcomes and democratic support)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DV	Against one-party system		Against one-party system		Against one-party system		Democracy index	
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender convictions	NA		-1.015^		-2.842**		-.386**	
			(.679)		(.998)		(.145)	
Lesser Offender convictions		-.274^		-.258^		-.588**		-.083*
		(.187)		(.174)		(.227)		(.033)
Fellow Traveler convictions	NA	.044^	.062*	.070*	.076*	.077*	.006	.006
		(.030)	(.027)	(.029)	(.037)	(.038)	(.005)	(.005)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,863	1,863	1,849	1,849

Standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 ^p<.15 (two-tailed)
NA – model failed to achieve convergence

Table A9 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main text using multi-level random intercept models. For models 1-6, which have a dichotomous DV, we used the *meprobit* command in Stata 13.1, while for models 7-8, which have a continuous DV, we used the *mixed* command.

With the exception of model 1, which failed to achieve convergence, the other models produce results that are very similar to the ones in the probit/OLS models with standard errors clustered at the *Land* level reported in Table 1. While the standard errors are somewhat larger in the multi-level models and as a result a few of the coefficients are now significant at .15 instead of .1, none of our substantive conclusions are affected. We still find that more widespread higher-level convictions are associated with lower democratic support, while more widespread low-level convictions promote greater democratic support.

Table A10: Controlling for procedural fairness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Opposed to one-party system						Democracy index	
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender convictions	-2.35** (.840)		-2.62 (1.653)		-9.41** (1.665)		-.939** (.189)	
Lesser offender convictions		-.590 (.415)		-.520 (.387)		-1.525* (.668)		-.149* (.048)
Fellow traveler convictions	.087** (.030)	.096 (.069)	.124# (.070)	.119 (.077)	.332** (.065)	.249* (.119)	.027** (.008)	.018* (.007)
Procedural justice index	-.081* (.038)	-.091 (.091)	-.114 (.099)	-.075 (.113)	-.461** (.113)	-.293 (.188)	-.040* (.017)	-.021 (.016)
Land-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-sq	.079	.079	.055	.055	.071	.068		
R-squared							.105	.104
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954

In Table A10 we re-run the models from Table 1 in the main analysis but include a control for the Procedural Justice Index, discussed in Table A3 above. The results confirm the patterns in the baseline models, with Offender convictions (which in our analysis include all those convicted as "Major Offenders" and "Offenders") and Lesser Offender convictions having a negative effect, while Fellow Traveler convictions have a positive effect on democratic support. Note that the magnitude of the convictions variables is larger than in the baseline models but it is also somewhat less precisely estimated due to the higher multicollinearity in the models that include the Procedural Justice Index.

Table A11: Controlling for Communist Party vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DV	Against one-party system		Against one-party system		Against one-party system		Democracy index	
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender Convictions	-1.173**		-.953#		-2.987**		-.393**	
	(.409)		(.543)		(.619)		(.113)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.281*		-.308*		-.751**		-.096**
		(.119)		(.124)		(.143)		(.028)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.058**	.068**	.115**	.141**	.129**	.160**	.009^	.012#
	(.018)	(.024)	(.037)	(.030)	(.028)	(.027)	(.005)	(.007)
CP vote share 1946	.013*	.019**	.046*	.057**	.048**	.063**	.003	.005#
	(.005)	(.006)	(.020)	(.017)	(.014)	(.013)	(.002)	(.003)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954
R-squared							.104	.104
Pseudo R-squared	.0788	.0788	.0554	.0560	.0705	.0713		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, # $p<.1$, ^$p<.15$ (two-tailed)

Table A11 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main text to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to the inclusion of Communist Party (CP) vote shares in the 1946-47 *Land* (regional) elections.

The justification for testing this control is that – as discussed in the main paper – we may worry that support for a one-party system could also be due to varying shares of communist sympathizers in different parts of Germany. To the extent that German Communists, despite the West German KPD's official embrace of multi-party elections, embraced Soviet-style single party regimes, then not controlling for CP support could results in omitted variable bias.

However, our results in Table A11 suggest that –at least at the aggregate level– higher CP support was actually associated with greater support for democracy (possibly because it captured stronger anti-Nazi sentiments.) Furthermore, the results in Table A11 reveal overall stronger denazification outcome effects than for the baseline models in Table 1 in the main text. In other words, by not including CP vote shares in our main regression models, we may be *underestimating* the impact of denazification outcomes. However, we chose not to include the CP vote share variable in the main specifications both because we were concerned with degrees-of-freedom limitations at the *Land*-level, and because by including CP vote shares we may introduce post-treatment bias since the 1946-47 elections arguably already reflected the political impact of the initial phase of different denazification strategies.

Table A12: Controlling for Partisanship of Ministerpräsident (post 1946-47)

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Against one-party system	(5) Against one-party system	(6) Against one-party system	(7) Democracy index	(8) Democracy index
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender Convictions	-1.351**		-.793*		-2.656**		-.445**	
	(.265)		(.393)		(.753)		(.087)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.303**		-.211*		-.528**		-.103**
		(.074)		(.100)		(.168)		(.022)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.046**	.047**	.055**	.062**	.077**	.075*	.006#	.007*
	(.011)	(.015)	(.019)	(.019)	(.027)	(.030)	(.003)	(.003)
SPD Minister-präsident 1946	.095**	.091**	-.282**	-.285**	-.178*	-.163#	.041**	.044**
	(.035)	(.032)	(.076)	(.072)	(.070)	(.086)	(.011)	(.014)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954
R-squared							.106	.106
Pseudo R-squared	.0790	.0789	.0575	.0575	.0689	.0677		

Table A12 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main analysis to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to another facet of subnational politics in the immediate post-WWII period: the political affiliation of the first *Ministerpräsident* (Regional Governors) following the 1946/47 *Landtag* elections. In particular, we may be concerned that in *Länder* where the social democratic SPD was in power during the denazification period we may see either a tougher approach towards denazification (to the extent that regional-level German authorities could influence the *Spruchkammern* decision making process) or that the discourse of regional political elites might affect how German citizens would view both denazification and nascent democratic institutions.

The results in Table A12 confirm that our findings are robust to the inclusion of a dummy variable controlling for partisanship at the *Land* level. Indeed, if anything, the statistical results are actually more consistently statistically significant once we include these controls. However, as in the case of CP voter shares (see Table A11), we chose not to include the variable in the main specifications both because we were concerned with degrees-of-freedom limitations at the *Land* level and because by including information based on the 1946/47 elections we worried about introducing post-treatment bias since the 1946-47 elections arguably already reflected the political impact of the initial phase of different denazification strategies.

It is also worth noting that we found very weak correlations between the partisan affiliation of the first *Ministerpräsident* following the 1946/47 elections and the *Land*-level conviction rates. This lack of a significant correlation reinforces our argument about the fact that differences in denazification outcomes were not endogenous to partisan political dynamics.

Table A13: Controlling for far-right party licensing (1949)

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Against one-party system	(5) Against one-party system	(6) Against one-party system	(7) Democracy index	(8) Democracy index
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender Convictions	-1.200 (1.187)		-2.564** (.897)		-3.257** (1.143)		-.446** (.120)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.214 (.235)		-.306* (.154)		-.694** (.219)		-.089* (.030)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.044* (.017)	.051** (.017)	.055* (.022)	.069** (.026)	.057 (.042)	.082* (.036)	-.001 (.008)	.002 (.009)
Far-right party Licensed 1949	.007 (.338)	.108 (.275)	-.371* (.180)	-.068 (.147)	-.168 (.312)	-.056 (.239)	-.040 (.035)	-.023 (.031)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,863	1,863	1,849	1,849
R-squared							.104	.104
Pseudo R-squared	.0787	.0786	.0554	.0544	.0668	.0664		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (two-tailed)

Table A13 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main analysis to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to controlling for another potentially important policy difference between the three Western occupation zones: whether in the first post-WWII democratic federal elections of 1949 far-right nationalist parties were allowed to compete in different *Länder*. The idea is that by allowing parties with greater ideological continuity to the Nazi regime to run in democratic elections (even though explicitly Neo-Nazi parties were banned in all zones) might allow for a longer half-life of authoritarian attitudinal legacies. While the effects of far-right party licensing were largely negative (in line with expectations), they only achieved statistical significance in one of the eight specifications (model 3).

More importantly for our purposes, our conclusions about the impact of denazification outcomes do not change once we account for cross-regional differences in party licensing. Except for models 7 and 8, the size of the outcome coefficients in Table A13 is comparable to the baseline results in Table 1 (and in a few instances noticeably larger.) The standard errors are somewhat larger than in Table 1, which is due to the greater multicollinearity introduced by the addition of the licensing variable into the model specification: since licensing rules were most permissive in the British zone, the party licensing variable is correlated with both offender/Lesser Offender convictions (at about -.45) and with Fellow Traveler convictions (at -.70).

Table A14: Controlling for occupying troops popularity

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Against one-party system	(5) Against one-party system	(6) Against one-party system	(7) Democracy index	(8) Democracy index
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender convictions	-1.293** (.390)		-1.079^ (.671)		-3.222** (.646)		-.431** (.101)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.335** (.111)		-.330* (.157)		-.767** (.158)		-.108** (.023)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.092** (.020)	.118** (.024)	.085 (.080)	.130# (.072)	.222** (.084)	.285** (.085)	.030* (.011)	.040** (.012)
Occupying troop popularity	.004* (.002)	.006** (.002)	.002 (.005)	.005 (.005)	.012# (.007)	.017* (.007)	.002* (.001)	.003* (.001)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,863	1,863	1,849	1,849
R-squared							.105	.105
Pseudo R-squared	.0789	.0789	.0543	.0545	.0687	.0687		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (two-tailed)

Table A14 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main analysis to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to controlling for another potentially important policy difference between the three Western zones: the relative popularity of soldiers from the three Allied powers in their respective occupation zones. Based on survey data from November-December 1951 reported by Merritt (1995, 256) we created an indicator of how German respondents evaluated the behavior of soldiers from their own zone to those from the other two occupation zones.[6] The results, which were only available at the zone level rather than being broken down by *Land*, suggest that British soldiers were the most popular and French soldiers were the least popular.

The results in Table A14 confirm that democratic support was generally stronger in areas where occupying troops were seen as behaving better (and the effects were at least marginally statistically significant in five of the eight models). However, from our perspective the more important finding is that rather than reducing the democratic impact of denazification outcomes, controlling for troop popularity actually increased both the substantive size and the statistical significance of the coefficients for the convictions indicators.[7] It should be noted, however, that introducing troop popularity into the model specifications exacerbates the multicollinearity concerns, since the variable is highly correlated with "Fellow Traveler" convictions (at -.93), which is why we have not included it into our standard model specifications in Table 1.

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[6] The survey question asked which soldiers were the best and the worst behaved among the occupying troops in West Germany. To calculate our index, we first calculated for each zone the net share of respondents who thought that soldiers from their zone behaved best vs. worst and then subtracted their assessment of their own occupation zones from their evaluations of soldiers from the other two zones.

[7] The only partial exception is with respect to Fellow Traveler convictions in models 3 and 4.

Table A15: Controlling for occupation zones

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Against one-party system	(5) Against one-party system	(6) Against one-party system	(7) Democracy index	(8) Democracy index
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender	-3.396		-8.779^		-8.317*		-.908	
Convictions	(2.529)		(5.488)		(3.512)		(.525)	
Lesser Offender		-.536^		-.453		-.565		-.115*
Convictions		(.368)		(.417)		(.500)		(.045)
Fellow Traveler	.108**	.143**	.109	.145#	.204**	.215*	.033*	.040**
convictions	(.029)	(.042)	(.076)	(.083)	(.073)	(.104)	(.012)	(.012)
US occupation zone	.115	-.077	.795	-.058	.361	-.312	.004	-.055#
	(.242)	(.099)	(.603)	(.149)	(.348)	(.211)	(.064)	(.028)
French occupation	-.379*	-.534**	-.343	-.360	-.729#	-.739	-.157*	-.185*
Zone	(.167)	(.201)	(.364)	(.379)	(.428)	(.571)	(.061)	(.059)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954
R-squared							.106	.106
Pseudo R-squared	.0791	.0791	.0554	.0546	.0690	.0681		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, # $p<.1$, ^$p<.15$ (two-tailed)

Table A15 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main analysis to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to the inclusion of dummy variables for the US and French occupation zones (with the British zone being the omitted category). Doing so might capture any other differences across the three occupation zones that we did not capture with the robustness tests reported in Tables A11-A14.

However, this approach has two important limitations. First, given that, as we have argued in the main text, denazification outcomes were shaped by the differential policies of the three occupation powers, including both outcomes and zone dummies in the same specification makes it more difficult to interpret the zone dummy effects (since they capture the zone effects net of denazification policies.) Second, and relatedly, the zone dummies are very highly correlated with denazification outcomes[8], which creates significant multi-collinearity problems. Therefore, it is not surprising that even though the size of the coefficients is generally larger (and sometimes substantially so) than in the baseline models of Table 1 in the main analysis, the statistical significance of the denazification outcome effects is generally lower in Table A15 due to the inflated standard errors. Nevertheless, the broad empirical patterns about the differential effects of high vs. low-level conviction rates are confirmed in Table A15 and are at least marginally significant in the expected directions in the majority of models.

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[8] Thus, the US zone dummy is correlated at .98 with *Offender convictions* and at .88 with *Minor Offender convictions*, while the French zone dummy is correlated at .81 with *Fellow Traveler convictions*.

Table A16: Controlling for NSDAP vote share in November 1932

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Against one-party system	(5) Against one-party system	(6) Against one-party system	(7) Democracy index	(8) Democracy index
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender Convictions	-1.230**		-.900^		-2.666**		-.395**	
	(.355)		(.589)		(.769)		(.114)	
Lesser Offender convictions		-.275**		-.222#		-.532**		-.084*
		(.097)		(.128)		(.169)		(.028)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.046**	.046*	.056#	.062*	.073*	.072*	.007^	.007
	(.015)	(.019)	(.030)	(.027)	(.035)	(.036)	(.004)	(.005)
NSDAP vote share Nov 1932	-.347#	-.336	-.777	-.816	-.927	-.972	-.147	-.160
	(.181)	(.208)	(.646)	(.623)	(.651)	(.591)	(.082)	(.092)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954
R-squared							.104	.104
Pseudo R-squared	.0787	.0786	.0536	.0536	.0672	.0661		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (two-tailed)

Table A16 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main analysis to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to using a different measure of the popular support for the Nazi regime before the end of World War II: the vote share of the NSDAP in the November 1932 elections (instead of the July 1932 elections as in the main specifications.)

As in the main specifications, we find consistent support for the negative effects of Offender convictions (that in our analysis include convictions in both the "Major Offenders" and "Offenders" categories) and Lesser Offender convictions, and the positive effects of higher Fellow Traveler convictions. Furthermore, there is at least some evidence that respondents from areas with stronger Nazi support in November 1932 were more reluctant to embrace democracy two decades later, which reinforces the validity of the measure.

Table A17: Controlling for letters to the editor in *Der Stürmer*

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2)	(3) Against one-party system	(4)	(5) Against one-party system	(6)	(7) Democracy index	(8)
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender Convictions	-.895		-1.605^		-2.704**		-.328#	
	(.690)		(1.018)		(.932)		(.153)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.169		-.372#		-.576**		-.065
		(.183)		(.200)		(.222)		(.038)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.040**	.041**	.028	.040#	.062*	.062*	.004	.003
	(.013)	(.015)	(.026)	(.022)	(.028)	(.031)	(.006)	(.006)
Stürmer letters per 10K	-.063	-.097	.238	.210	.042	.055	-.004	-.003
	(.121)	(.131)	(.250)	(.231)	(.043)	(.045)	(.004)	(.004)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,863	1,863	1,849	1,849
R-squared							.103	.103
Pseudo R-squared	.0787	.0786	.0536	.0535	.0681	.0675		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (two-tailed)

Table A17 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main analysis to test whether our findings about the democratic support effects of denazification outcomes are robust to using a different measure of the popular support for the Nazi regime before the end of World War II. Since there are no election results or public opinion surveys from the 1933-45 period that can be used to gauge this support, we have tried to create an alternative indicator based on data from Voigtländer and Voth (2012). These authors collected locality-level data of the number of letters submitted to the Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer* from 1935-38 to use as an anti-Semitism indicator. Using the geographic coordinates of localities, we aggregated the letters up to the *Land* level, and then calculated the number of letters per 10,000 inhabitants for each *Land* based on locality-level population statistics from the 1933 German census.

However, it should be noted that this measure has a number of limitations: first, Voigtländer and Voth (2012) only collected the data for a subset of localities for which they had data on Jewish settlements, which means that the measure does not capture information for all German localities. This probably undermines the degree to which the *Land*-level aggregates are representative of overall Nazi support. Second, given that *Der Stürmer* was published in Nurnberg, it is conceivable that higher shares of letters from nearby areas could reflect at least in part the greater regional visibility of the paper in certain areas and, thus, yield a biased measure of actual anti-Semitism/Nazi support. Third, the resulting measure does not fare particularly well in terms of face validity: it is correlated negatively with Nazi *Land*-level vote shares in the July 1932, November 1932 and March 1933 elections, and it is also negatively correlated with support for a possible revival of the Nazi party based on the question from the 1957 survey (see Table A4 for question wording). Fourth, we have no information on whether the letters to the editor published in *Der Stürmer* are a representative sample of the letter received by the paper. Finally, when we include the *Stürmer* letters frequency in our regression models, we do not find any evidence that areas

with more active letter writers were more anti-democratic (and in fact the results point in the wrong direction in four of the eight models).

Keeping in mind the limitations above, the results in Table A17 nevertheless reveal broadly similar effects for the denazification outcomes indicators as in the baseline models from Table 1, where we used NSDAP vote shares in July 1932 to gauge *Land*-level Nazi support. While a few of the coefficients are smaller and have somewhat weaker statistical significance in Table A17, most of coefficients for the denazification outcome variables are at least marginally significant in the expected direction.

Table A18: Using internment rates as a measure of high-level convictions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DV	Against one-party system		Against one-party system		Against one-party system		Democracy index	
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Post-1947 internment rates	-1.134**		-.866^		-2.405**		-.352*	
	(.278)		(.595)		(.752)		(.119)	
Total internment rates		-.610**		-.468^		-1.289**		-.189*
		(.157)		(.318)		(.411)		(.067)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.048**	.043**	.065*	.062*	.077*	.067#	.007^	.005
	(.014)	(.013)	(.032)	(.030)	(.039)	(.037)	(.004)	(.004)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,479	1,479	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954
R-squared							.104	.104
Pseudo R-squared	.0788	.0787	.0540	.0540	.0668	.0667		

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, # $p<.1$, ^$p<.15$ (two-tailed)

Whereas in Tables A11-A17 our approach was to add/substitute various additional control variables to the model specification in order to test the robustness of the conviction rates effects, in Table A18 we use a slightly different approach. The reason for doing so is that the indicator we are trying to test – the proportion of residents of a given occupation zone who were held in internment camps after 1945 – is not really an alternative theoretical explanation of democratic support patterns. Instead, we can think of *internment rates* as an alternative measure of high-level convictions, with longer internments (past January 1947) qualifying as harsher punishments.[9] This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that there is significant overlap between the German citizens held in internment camps and the ones eventually convicted in one of the top three denazification categories. Furthermore, *internment rates* are correlated at .98 with *Offender convictions* and at .88 with *Lesser Offender convictions*, which would make the results of a model that simultaneously includes both variables highly unstable and difficult to interpret.

The results in Table A18 reveal very similar patterns to the ones in Table 1 in the article: Whereas the effects of more widespread internments during the first phase of denazification were negative and at least marginally significant across the eight models, more widespread Fellow Traveler convictions once again had a significant positive effect on democratic support. This finding further reinforces the robustness of the empirical support for Hypothesis 1.

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[9] Data from Cohen (2006:69).

Table A19: Using death sentences imposed by military tribunals as a measure of high-level convictions

Dependent Variable	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Democracy index
Survey year	1953	1955	1957	1957
Death sentences per 100K	-.263**	-.198	-.577**	-.084**
	(.054)	(.145)	(.163)	(.024)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.071**	.083#	.130**	.014*
	(.015)	(.043)	(.050)	(.006)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	1,479	1,968	1,954
R-squared				.104
Pseudo R-squared	.0789	.0540	.0674	

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, # $p<.1$, ^$p<.15$ (two-tailed)

Along similar lines as in Table A18, in Table A19 we use the rate of death sentences (per 100 thousand inhabitants) imposed in military tribunals in each zone as an alternative measure for how widespread harsh punishments were across different parts of Germany. While the data for this measure, which was based on Rückerl (1979: 28-29), was only available at the zone level (rather than at the *Land* level), the overall patterns still confirm the predictions of Hypothesis 1 whereby more widespread harsh punishments undermined democratic support, while more widespread low-level punishment was associated with stronger democratic support.

Table A20: Alternative imputation methods for "Major Offenders" and "Offenders" convictions in the UK zone

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2)	(3)	(4) Against one-party system	(5)	(6)	(7) Against one-party system	(8)	(9)	(10) Democracy index	(11)	(12)
Year	1953	1953	1953	1955	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender convictions	-1.09**	-1.10**	-.940**	-.898#	-.951#	-.798^	-2.53**	-2.54**	-1.85**	-.349**	-.349**	-.299**
	(.330)	(.331)	(0.301)	(.537)	(.524)	(.519)	(.717)	(.718)	(.666)	(.102)	(.102)	(.090)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.048**	.048**	.049**	.066*	.067*	.067*	.087*	.087*	.076^	.007	.007	.007
	(.017)	(.017)	(.018)	(.031)	(.031)	(.031)	(.037)	(.037)	(.041)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Imputation method	PR	NW	MI	PR	NW	MI	PR	NW	MI	PR	NW	MI
Observations	2,523	2,523	2,523	1,478	1,478	1,478	1,968	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954	1,954

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (two-tailed)

Reported statistics on *Spruchkammern* convictions in the UK zone do not include data for the "Major Offenders" and "Offenders" categories, which remained under the direct supervision of the military authorities, except for the *Land* of Nordrhein-Westfalen (Vollnhals 1991:33). In the main analysis we estimate the "Major Offenders" and "Offenders" convictions rates in the British zone by adding the zone-level convictions by the *Spruchgerichte* to *Land*-level estimates of convictions in the *Spruchkammern*. To account for potential differences within the British zone, we base our estimates of the missing values for "Major Offenders" and "Offenders" convictions by *Spruchkammern* in Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Niedersachsen on the actual conviction rates in Nordrhein-Westfalen multiplied by the ratio in "Lesser Offenders" convictions between Nordrhein-Westfalen and the respective *Land*.

To account for the possibility that the high-level convictions imposed by the British-run *Spruchgerichte* had different implications for democratic legitimacy than those of the *Spruchkammern* (where Germans had greater input), in Table A20 we test the robustness of our results to using only *Spruchkammern* convictions for the British-zone *Länder* and we show the results of three different approaches for imputing the missing data in *Spruchkammer* convictions for Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen. The first, marked as PR and presented in models 1, 4, 7, and 10 uses the same approach as in the main analysis and estimates the missing values based on the actual conviction rates in Nordrhein-Westfalen and the ratios in "Lesser Offenders" convictions between Nordrhein-Westfalen and the respective *Land*. The second approach, marked as NW and presented in models 2, 5, 8 and 11, was to code the other *Länder* of the British zone as having the same "Major offenders" and "Offenders" conviction rates as the actual rates in Nordrhein-Westfalen. The final approach was to use the multiple imputation package (*mi*) in Stata 13.1 and to impute the missing "Major offenders" and "Offenders" conviction rates based on "Lesser Offenders" and "Fellow Travelers" conviction rates. The results for this approach are presented in models 3, 6, 9, and 12. When compared to the baseline results –models 1, 3, 5, and 16 in Table 1 in the main text– we find that even though the multiple imputation approach yields

slightly weaker results, the results of all three imputation methods are very similar in both magnitude and statistical significance to our main regression tables and to each other.

Table A21: Using zone-level instead of *Land*-level denazification indicators

Table A21 reruns the models from Table 1 in the main text using zone-level averages in conviction rates instead of land-level conviction rates. This represents a more conservative approach to evaluating the impact of the differences in the denazification approaches of the military authorities in the three occupation zones by assuming a uniform treatment across all areas in a particular zone (to reflect the logic that the treatment differences should operate at the zone-level.) However, it should be noted that there are strong reasons to suspect that respondents are more likely to respond to land-level than to zone-level conviction rates, since the former are likely a closer reflection of the local conditions experienced by survey respondents. Furthermore, as discussed in the paper, much of the mass media operated at the local or land-level, rather than at the zone-level, which also suggests that respondents would have been more likely to be informed about land-level than zone-level conviction rates.

DV	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Against one-party system	(4) Against one-party system	(5) Against one-party system	(6) Against one-party system	(7) Democracy index	(8) Democracy index
Year	1953	1953	1955	1955	1957	1957	1957	1957
Offender Convictions	-.995** (.370)		-.819^ (.561)		-2.26** (.825)		-.313# (.141)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.241* (.096)		-.204^ (.140)		-.568** (.203)		-.075# (.035)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.035* (.016)	.050* (.023)	.054* (.024)	.067* (.030)	.051 (.034)	.089* (.043)	.003 (.005)	.008 (.007)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,523	2,523	1,478	1,478	1,968	1,968	1,954	1,954

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (two-tailed)

The results in Table A21 confirm that both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the effects of different types of conviction rates are very similar to the baseline models in Table 1, though the estimates are somewhat noisier given the higher correlations for the zone-level measures.

Table A22: Excluding respondents affected by TJ

VARIABLES	(1) Against one-party system	(2) Against one-party system	(3) Democracy index	(4) Democracy index
Offender Convictions	-3.503** (.832)		-.437** (.134)	
Lesser Offender Convictions		-.710** (.184)		-.094* (.035)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.089** (.032)	.088** (.034)	.005 (.005)	.006 (.006)
Land-level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,717	1,717	1,707	1,707
R-squared			.118	.118
Pseudo R-squared	.0807	.0790		

Since the TJ literature has established that defendants have different reactions to punishment than bystanders (e.g. Tyler 2000) and since denazification punishments ultimately affected a non-trivial proportion of the population, we want to make sure that our findings are not driven by these individuals. Therefore, in Table A22 we take advantage of a question from the 1957 survey, which asked whether a respondent or her family was affected by denazification, and exclude such respondents (about 11% of the total) from the sample. The results in Table A22 confirm that our results from models 5-8 in Table 1 in the main analysis are robust to the exclusion of TJ targets (and, in fact, the results are slightly stronger than in the baseline analysis.)

Table A23: Conviction rates, mass media consumption and social interactions (1957)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Offender convictions	-.180	-.137	-.215*	-.332				
	(.195)	(.278)	(.077)	(.223)				
Newspaper frequency* Offender convictions	-.057^							
	(.043)							
Radio frequency* Offender convictions		-.084^						
		(.071)						
Many acquaintances* Offender convictions			-.425**					
			(.124)					
Frequent bowling* Offender convictions				-.928*				
				(.417)				
Lesser Offender convictions					-.044	.016	-.059*	-.068
					(.039)	(.066)	(.022)	(.055)
Newspaper frequency* Lesser Offender convictions					-.011^			
					(.008)			
Radio frequency* Lesser Offender convictions						-.031*		
						(.017)		
Many acquaintances* Lesser Offender convictions							-.065*	
							(.033)	
Frequent bowling* Lesser Offender convictions								-.261**
								(.077)
Fellow Traveler convictions	-.001	-.003	.001	.006	-.001	-.006	.002	.006
	(.005)	(.008)	(.003)	(.008)	(.005)	(.008)	(.004)	(.008)
Newspaper frequency* Fellow Traveler convictions	.002*				.002*			
	(.001)				(.001)			
Radio frequency* Fellow Traveler convictions		.003#				.004*		
		(.002)				(.002)		
Many acquaintances* Fellow Traveler convictions			.012*				.011#	
			(.006)				(.006)	
Frequent bowling* Fellow Traveler convictions				.021#				.023*
				(.012)				(.011)
Newspaper frequency	.019**				.020**			
	(.002)				(.002)			
Radio frequency		.022#				.025*		
		(.010)				(.008)		
Many acquaintances			.018				.016	
			(.013)				(.017)	
Frequent bowling				.022				.052
				(.019)				(.030)
Land-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,947	1,827	1,923	1,295	1,947	1,827	1,923	1,295
R-squared	.119	.112	.107	.093	.119	.113	.106	.093

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (one-tailed)

This table presents the regression results underlying the simulations presented in Figure 3 in the main text and in Figure A1 below (and which are discussed in greater detail in the main text).

Figure A1. Denazification outcomes and democracy support: Media and social context

Fig. A1: Denazification Outcomes and Democracy Support: Media and Social Context

Note: The figure illustrates the conditional effect of a change from the 10th to the 90th percentile in combined conviction rates of "Lesser Offenders" and the more lenient punishment category of "Fellow Travelers" for individuals at either the low or the high end of media and social exposure. The overall pattern in Figure A1 is quite clear and mirrors the pattern illustrated in Figure 3 in the main analysis, where we compare the moderating influence of sociability and media exposure on conviction rates of "Major Offenders" and "Offenders" (which we combine in a single category of "Offenders") and "Fellow Travelers". Both the anti-democratic impact of more widespread "Lesser Offender" convictions and the pro-democratic effects of broader "Fellow Travelers" sanctions are more pronounced among people with greater mass media consumption and more active social interactions.

Table A24: Testing of H2a and H2b on 1953 survey data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Offender convictions	-1.134**	.045	.163	-.861**				
	(.290)	(.419)	(.457)	(.239)				
Radio political commentary listener* Offender convictions	-3.095**							
	(.962)							
Radio news listener* Offender convictions		-3.462**						
		(.868)						
Pol discussion w/ friends* Offender convictions			-6.641**					
			(2.164)					
Pol discussion w/ likeminded* Offender convictions				-3.244				
				(2.378)				
Lesser Offender convictions					-.257**	-.009	-.057	-.189*
					(.077)	(.113)	(.124)	(.096)
Radio political commentary listener* Lesser Offender convictions					-.599*			
					(.300)			
Radio news listener* Lesser Offender convictions						-.723**		
						(.219)		
Pol discussion w/ friends* Lesser Offender convictions							-1.288*	
							(.600)	
Pol discussion w/ likeminded* Lesser Offender convictions								-1.550*
								(.694)
Fellow Traveler convictions	.036**	.007	.040*	.055*	.035*	.004	.047*	.055#
	(.013)	(.009)	(.019)	(.025)	(.015)	(.008)	(.018)	(.031)
Radio political commentary listener* Fellow Traveler convictions	.031				.031			
	(.034)				(.038)			
Radio news listener* Fellow Traveler convictions		.085**				.088**		
		(.027)				(.029)		
Pol discussion w/ friends* Fellow Traveler convictions			.160**				.150#	
			(.062)				(.081)	
Pol discussion w/ likeminded* Fellow Traveler convictions				.116				.204
				(.137)				(.159)
Radio political commentary listener	.550**				.550**			
	(.141)				(.188)			
Radio news listener		.169#				.189		
		(.097)				(.158)		
Pol discussion w/ friends			.098				.139	
			(.116)				(.210)	
Pol discussion w/ likeminded				.322				.514*
				(.281)				(.256)
Observations	2,209	2,209	1,113	1,113	2,209	2,209	1,113	1,113
Pseudo R-squared	.0890	.0842	.135	.135	.0884	.0835	.134	.137

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1, ^p<.15 (one-tailed)

In the main analysis, we test H2a and H2b using the analysis in Table A23 above based on data from the 1957 survey. In Table A24 we use variables from the 1953 survey to test the robustness of our finding that respondents who are more exposed to the media and to social interactions are more responsive in their democratic attitudes to the conviction rates in their own *Land*.

We used four moderating variables that we interacted with *Land*-level conviction rates. The first captures whether respondents reported listening to political commentary on the radio; the second measures whether they listened to the news. For both of these measures of exposure to political information through the mass media we find negative (and statistically significant) interaction effects for the tougher punishment categories, and positive (and at least partially significant) interaction effects for Fellow Traveler convictions. These results are in line with our findings in Table A23 and confirm H2a, namely that respondents who, based on their media consumption, can be expected to be more aware of the denazification process were indeed more responsive in a way that conforms to our theoretical expectations to *Land*-level denazification conviction rates than their less media-exposed compatriots.

The second set of variables captures the social dimension of information dissemination. In models 3 and 7 we show that respondents who reported discussing politics with their friends were more sensitive to both the negative effects on pro-democratic attitudes of high-level convictions and the positive effect of low-level Fellow Traveler convictions. Models 4 and 8 reveal very similar patterns for respondents who discussed politics with people with similar political views. While these findings suggest that in line with H2b social interactions played an important role in disseminating the information about denazification outcomes, in separate tests (not presented here) we found that these patterns where weaker when respondents were asked about political discussions in general and disappeared entirely when the discussion partners were colleagues at work. While these findings go beyond the scope of the present article, they nevertheless suggest that Germans were more likely to discuss the very sensitive issue of denazification with people they trusted (either because they were family or because they shared political opinions) than in more formal contexts.

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