

Trying perpetrators: Denazification trials and support for democracy in West Germany

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Table A1 – Denazification conviction statistics and procedural justice index by Land

Land	Zone	Major offenders+ offenders ^a	Lesser offenders ^b	Fellow travelers ^c	Total convictions		Outcome fairness index (0-1)	Procedural justice index (0-1)
		Number	Number	Number	Number	% pop		
Baden	French	393	10653	19154	30200	2.52	0.53	1
Bayern	US	11783	52940	215585	280308	3.10	0.70	0
Berlin ^d	Int'l	1590	8530	59079	69199	2.38	0.49	.39
Bremen	US	394	815	14640	15849	3.26	0.75	0
Hamburg	British	341	1084	15052	16017	1.20	0.15	.19
Hessen	US	5766	28208	133722	167696	4.13	1	0
Niedersachsen	British	1523	610	40250	42383	0.70	0	.15
Nordrhein-Westfalen	British	2879	23266	100226	126371	1.12	0.12	.15
Rheinland-Pfalz	French	445	4840	18474	23759	0.86	0.05	1
Saarland ^e	French	179	3165	9191	12534	1.31	0.18	.95
Schleswig-Holstein	British	635	2217	66500	68352	2.66	0.57	.15
Württemberg-Baden	US	5833	24459	121110	151402	4.12	1	0
Württemberg-Hohenzollern	French	113	1333	11241	12687	1.13	0.13	1
Total	All	31874	162120	824224	1016757			
% of total convictions		3.1%	15.9%	81.1%				

Notes:

- a. Data for US and French zone from Vollnhals (1991:333); for British zone author's calculations based on Wember (1991:318)
- b. Data for US and French zone from Vollnhals; for British zone from Vollnhals (1991:333) and Wember (1991:318)
- c. Data for all three zones from Vollnhals (1991:333). For French zone this only includes those not amnestied early.
- d. Conviction rates for Berlin were calculated as population-weighted averages of the three zones, since detailed conviction statistics were not available (and the 1957 survey did not specify which sector of Berlin respondents were living in.) Our findings do not change if Berlin is excluded from the analysis (see Table A7).
- e. Since no detailed conviction statistics were available for Saarland, we used average conviction rates for the French zone. Our findings do not change if Saarland is excluded from the analysis (see Table A7).

Table A2 – Index of procedural justice: components, operationalization, data sources

Dimension of procedural justice	Definition	Measure
Quality of decisions	Did authorities get the information they needed to make good decisions?	Individualized guilt as opposed to automatic attribution of guilt
Ethicality	Had authorities shown concern for respondents' rights?	“Common work” requirement for length of denazification proceedings
Correctability	Did respondents know of any “agency or organization” to which they could have complained about unfair treatment?	Actual possibility of reversing or correcting initial sentences
Control/representation	“Process control” - opportunity to present case to the authorities before decisions were made. “Decision control” - how much influence respondents had over decisions	Length of time in which <i>Spruchkammern</i> were operational
Impartiality	Bias: Was treatment or outcome influenced by their “race, sex, age, nationality, or some other characteristic of them as a person”?	Universal imposition of questionnaires
	Dishonesty: Did authorities do anything “improper or dishonest”?	No systematic information on subnational variation
	Effort to be fair: How hard had the police or judge tried to show fairness?	No systematic information on subnational variation

Dimensions of procedural justice are drawn from Tyler (1988)

We build a measure of procedural justice based on the dimensions in the table above. Each component is weighed equally and added to form the index. Below we briefly discuss our operationalization strategies and data sources.

“Quality of decisions”: we consider whether military authorities adopted a collective and automatic conception of guilt – by which belonging to a certain organization (e.g. the NSDAP) or having a certain professional position (e.g. public employee) was considered an automatic indicator of guilt – or whether they considered each individual case on its own merits. The US and the UK authorities adopted the former conception, while the French authorities adopted the latter (e.g. Biddiscombe 2007, 158). We score this dimension dichotomously, with 1 indicating higher quality.

“Ethicality”: Our indicator – whether the defendant in a denazification trial was prohibited from engaging in anything else than “common work” (an expression by which the legislation meant forms of manual or low-level subordinate labor) for the whole duration of the proceedings – similarly sets apart the *Länder* of

the French zone from those of the other two. The French military authorities, in fact, explicitly rejected art. 58 of the *Befreiungsgesetz* where such prohibition was included. The article in question was instead applied in the other two zones (Vollnhals 1991, 41). We score this dimension dichotomously, with 1 indicating higher ethicality.

“Correctability”: Procedures adopted in the *Länder* of the French zones also stand out from those occupied by British and American forces in terms of “Correctability”. While the verdicts issued by the *Spruchkammern* could in principle be appealed in all zones, in the French zone the possibility of reversing previous judgment was enhanced by the fact that the *Spruchkammern*, once introduced, did not try new cases. Instead, *Spruchkammern* in the French zone concentrated on reviewing denazification decisions that had been taken in the earlier phase of the occupation, in many cases overturning prior decisions of conviction or demoting individuals to lower categories of guilt (Grohnert 1991, 205-207). We score this dimension dichotomously, with 1 indicating higher correctability.

“Control/Representation”: For this dimension we adopt a continuous measure, corresponding to the number of months between May 1945 and August 1949¹ in which each *Land* had a quasi-judicial system in place, staffed by Germans, in which defendants had the right to be heard and the evidence they brought influenced the decision (essentially, the *Spruchkammern* system that we describe in the paper). As explained in the main paper, the different zones switched to the *Spruchkammern* system from previous denazification regimes. These earlier regimes varied slightly across *Länder* and zones, and were partially reformed at different points in time, but all of them shared the fundamental characteristics that military authorities had more power and defendants generally had no right to be heard. Even though in some cases (in the French zone, and the UK zone for the higher categories of guilt) military authorities formally retained the power of final decision even when *Spruchkammern* were empaneled, *de facto* they hardly used those powers.

To normalize our measure of “Control/Representation”, we divide the number of months in which *Spruchkammern* were operational² by the maximum number of months, among all *Länder*, in which the system was in place (forty-two months in all US zone *Länder*). The scores for different *Länder* range from 0.52 to 1. We have no information on West-Berlin, which we score as a weighted average of the average scores of the three zones. The variable was recoded to a 0-1 scale for the purpose of creating the index, with higher values indicating higher control/representation.

¹ The start and end of this time span are given respectively by the capitulation of the *Reich* in May 1945 to the month before the creation of the Federal Republic in September 1949, competencies on denazification were passed to the *Länder* administrations (our conviction data are also recorded at 31 August 1949, see Fig. 1 in main paper). The starting date is strictly speaking not entirely accurate as several Western areas of the *Reich* were occupied earlier as the Allied troops advanced through Germany. Lacking information on the exact period of occupation of different regions before the *Reich* capitulation, of how such regions would map onto post-1945 *Land* boundaries, and on whether such territories were occupied by US or UK troops, we chose to focus on May 1945 as a starting point to measure this index component.

² This might differ slightly from when the system was formally approved. For example, in Baden the new system was formally introduced in March 1947, and in Rheinland-Pfalz and Württemberg-Hohenzollern in April 1947, but in all three *Länder* the *Spruchkammern* became operational only in October of the same year (Vollnhals 1991, 40)

Table A2.1—Control/Representation procedural justice dimension in the Western *Länder*
Land Zone *Spruchkammern* system in force during:

Schleswig-Holstein	UK	Nov 47-Aug 49
Hamburg	UK	May 47-Aug 49
Niedersachsen	UK	Nov 47-Aug 49
Nordrhein-Westfalen	UK	Nov 47-Aug 49
Bremen	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Hessen	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Württemberg-Baden	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Bayern	US	Mar 46-Aug 49
Rheinland-Pfalz	F	Oct 47-Aug 49
Baden	F	Oct 47-Aug 49
Württemberg-Hohenzollern	F	Oct 47-Aug 49
Saarland	F	May 48-Aug 49

“Impartiality”: Tyler identifies three sub-dimensions of “Impartiality”: “Bias”, “Dishonesty”, and “Effort to be fair”. We have no information on the latter two in the case of denazification in Western Germany. Regarding “Bias”, one way to capture whether authorities attributed guilt on the basis of individual characteristics such as nationality is to consider their policies on the administration of questionnaires to potential defendants. In the US zone, all Germans above 18 years of age were obliged to compile a questionnaire on their activities during the Nazi regime, which would then constitute the basis for potential prosecution. In the French and the UK zones, instead, similar questionnaires were used only for individuals in senior positions in the public administration, thus linking the presumption of guilt not to nationality (and age) as such but to the function that the individuals had exerted in the Nazi regime. This measure sets the US zone apart from the other two. We score this dimension dichotomously.

Table A3 -- Categories of guilt and sanction (Directive N. 38 of Control Council, 12 October 1946, Part II, Articles 1-13)³

Category	Criteria for inclusion	Main possible sanctions
Major offenders (<i>Hauptschuldige</i>)	<p>Perpetration of political crimes or acts of brutality on behalf of the regime;</p> <p>Holding of leading positions in the NSDAP or any Nazi organizations, as well as in the administration of the <i>Reich, Länder</i> and occupied areas;</p> <p>Active engagement in or collaboration with the Gestapo, SS and similar police organizations;</p> <p>Members of the High Command of the Armed Forces</p>	<p>Up to 10 years of imprisonment; full requisitioning of property; loss of political rights (electability and vote); loss of rights to a public pension; restriction of rights of residence; prohibition for 10 years to engage in anything else than “common work”.</p>
Offenders (<i>Belastete</i>)	<p>Offenders included “Activists”, “Militarists” and “Profiteers”, each defined broadly. Criteria ranged from supporting Nazism in public or in education; perpetrating or advocating violence against opponents of Nazism; abusing office as a judge or prosecutor; advocating militarism or the domination of other peoples; having any undue advantage (including promotions to any office or position) deriving from NSDAP membership; profiteering from arms’ trade or occupation of foreign territories. <i>De facto</i>, these criteria allowed for inclusion in this category all lower officials of the Nazi organizations, all members of the NSDAP before May 1937, and all members of the Waffen-SS and the SS.</p> <p>The further criterion of responsibility for the “devastation of cities and country places” after the Allies’ invasion of Germany allowed the inclusion of high army officers.</p>	<p>Up to 10 years labor camp; partial or full requisition of property; loss of political rights (electability and vote); loss of rights to a public pension; restriction of right of leaving their occupation zone; prohibition for 5 years to engage in anything else than "common work".</p>
Lesser offenders (<i>Minderbelastete</i>)	<p>Anyone (including former members of the Armed Forces) who would be classifiable as an Offender but “because of special circumstances seems worthy of a milder judgement and can be expected according to his character to fulfil his duties as a citizen of a peaceful democratic state after ... a period of probation” (Art. 4.I.1)</p> <p>This was presumed of anybody born after 1/1/1919, and anybody who withdrew from Nazism “at an early time” (as long as not classifiable as major offenders)</p> <p>Anyone who would be classifiable as a Fellow Traveler “...but because of his conduct and in view of his character will first have to prove himself” (Art. 4.I.2)</p>	<p>Probation for two to three years, after which they will be classified as Offenders or Fellow Travelers. During probation: prohibition to own, operate, supervise or acquire any enterprise of more than 20 employees; to work as a teacher, author, preacher, radio commentator, or to exercise an independent profession; if civil servants, partial loss of salary or pension and demotion.</p>

³ See the full text of the directive in Ruhm von Oppen (1995).

<p>“Fellow Travelers” (“Followers”) (<i>Mitläufer</i>)</p>	<p>Being no more than “a nominal participant in, or a supporter of” the Nazi regime. This included mainly those members of the NSDAP who did no more than pay membership duties, attend compulsory meetings, and carry out routine tasks, as well as those former members of the Armed forces who, in the opinion of a Zone Commander, could “endanger Allied purposes”.</p>	<p>At the discretion of the Zone Commander: report periodically to the police; leaving their Zone subject to permission; loss of electability to public office (but not of right to vote); if civil servants, partial loss of salary or pension, and demotion; one-off or running payment to a common reparation fund.</p>
<p>Exonerated persons (<i>Entlastete</i>)</p>	<p>Those who, although incriminated, could prove their innocence, as well as those who, even though they may have belonged only formally to a Nazi organization, could prove that they actively resisted the Nazi regime within their possibilities, and that they were disadvantaged by such actions.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

Table A4: Survey question wording

Variable number	German original	English translation
V467	Glauben sie, dass es fuer unser Land besser ist, eine Partei zu haben, damit moeglichst grosse Einigkeit herrscht, oder mehrere Parteien, damit die verschiedenen Meinungen frei vertreten werden koennen?	Do you think that it's better for our country to have one party, so there is as much unity as possible, or multiple parties, so that the different opinions can be freely represented?
V184	Wenn man das einmal ganz von der nuetzlichen Seite betrachtet: Brauchen wir in Bonn denn ein Parlament und lauter Abgeordnete, oder ginge es auch ohne?	If we look at it from a purely practical side: Do we really need a Parliament and all those deputies in Bonn, or could we do without them?
V241	Zwei Männer unterhalten sich darüber, wie man ein Land regieren soll. - Der eine sagt: Mir gefällt es am besten wenn das Volk den besten Politiker an die Spitze stellt und ihm die ganze Regierungsgewalt überträgt. Der kann dann mit ein paar ausgesuchten Fachleuten klar und schnell entscheiden. Es wird nicht viel geredet und es geschieht wirklich was. - Der andere sagt: Mir ist es lieber. wenn mehrere Leute etwas im Staat zu bestimmen haben. Da geht es zwar manchmal hin und her bis was getan wird, aber es kann nicht so leicht vorkommen. daß die Regierungsgewalt missbraucht wird. Welche dieser beiden Meinungen kommt Ihrer eigenen Ansicht am nächsten - die erste oder die zweite?	Two men talk about how one should rule a country. - The first one says: I like it best when the people but the best politician in charge and transfer him all the governing power. With a few chosen experts he can then decide clearly and quickly. There is not much talking and things would get done. -The other one says: I like it better when more people get to decide something in the state. Sometimes things have to go back and forth until something gets done but it cannot happen as easily that the governing power gets misused (abused). Which of these two opinions comes closer to your own opinion – the first or the second?
V242	Angenommen, eine neue Nationalsozialistische Partei versucht, an die Macht zu kommen: Wie wuerden Sie sich da verhalten? Hier sind die verschiedenen Moeglichkeiten: 1. Ich wuerde es begruessen und wuerde eine solche Partei unterstuetzen 2. Ich wuerde es begruessen aber nichts besonders dafuer tun 3. Waere mir egal 4. Ich waere dagegen, aber wuerde nichts besonders tun 5. Ich wuerde alles tun, was ich koennte, damit so etwas nicht passiert	Let's assume that a new National Socialist party tries to come to power: how would you react? Here are the different possibilities: 1. I would applaud it and would support such a party 2. I would applaud it but not do anything special about it 3. I would be indifferent 4. I would be opposed but not do anything special about it 5. I would do everything I could so that something like that does not happen.

Table A5: Summary statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Democracy index	1956	0.73	0.25	0	1
Denazification defendant	1941	0.05	0.23	0	1
Family member of defendant	1941	0.07	0.25	0	1
Procedural justice index	1954	0.20	0.25	0	1
Outcome fairness index (Total convictions/population)	1954	0.41	0.34	0	1
Unemployment % (1956)	1954	2.86	1.98	1.21	9.53
NSDAP vote share July 1932	1954	0.34	0.08	0.07	0.51
Refugee share %	1954	15.66	7.42	0.76	33
Refugee	1956	0.22	0.42	0	1
Protestant	1956	0.53	0.50	0	1
Catholic	1956	0.40	0.49	0	1
Other religion	1956	0.02	0.12	0	1
Male	1956	0.47	0.50	0	1
Single	1956	0.21	0.40	0	1
Widowed	1956	0.09	0.28	0	1
Divorced	1956	0.02	0.15	0	1
Middle maturity education	1956	0.16	0.37	0	1
High school education	1956	0.04	0.20	0	1
University education	1956	0.01	0.11	0	1
Agricultural occupation	1956	0.10	0.30	0	1
Worker	1956	0.29	0.46	0	1
Pensioner	1956	0.10	0.30	0	1
Self-employed	1956	0.07	0.25	0	1
Unemployed	1956	0.01	0.08	0	1
Homemaker	1956	0.26	0.44	0	1
Age 21-25	1956	0.10	0.30	0	1
Age 26-29	1956	0.08	0.27	0	1
Age 30-39	1956	0.18	0.39	0	1
Age 40-44	1956	0.10	0.30	0	1
Age 45-59	1956	0.28	0.45	0	1
Age 60+	1956	0.19	0.39	0	1
Income <250DM	1956	0.16	0.37	0	1
Income 250-399DM	1956	0.36	0.48	0	1
Income 400-599DM	1956	0.31	0.46	0	1
Income 600-799DM	1956	0.11	0.31	0	1
Income >800DM	1956	0.05	0.22	0	1
Locality size <2K	1956	0.25	0.43	0	1
Locality size 2-20K	1956	0.29	0.45	0	1
Locality size 20-100K	1956	0.14	0.35	0	1
Locality size >100K	1956	0.33	0.47	0	1

Table A6: Regression results and robustness checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Defendant	-.083*	-.198**	-.239**	-.351**	-.385**	-.199**	-.285**
	(.027)	(.044)	(.055)	(.098)	(.109)	(.044)	(.050)
Family member	-.071**	-.101#	-.114#	-.149	-.159	-.101#	-.148*
	(.023)	(.053)	(.059)	(.110)	(.123)	(.054)	(.058)
Procedural justice index	.039	.027	.022	.020	.014	.037	.290#
	(.030)	(.035)	(.036)	(.032)	(.033)	(.031)	(.143)
Defendant# Procedural justice index		.110#	.108#	.115	.143	.109#	.781#
		(.055)	(.056)	(.083)	(.087)	(.055)	(.355)
Family member# Procedural justice index		.085	.088	.093	.101	.084	.502*
		(.099)	(.098)	(.097)	(.103)	(.099)	(.207)
Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)	-.014	-.026				-.022	.051
	(.014)	(.016)				(.018)	(.031)
Defendant# Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)		.185**				.187**	.148#
		(.048)				(.049)	(.077)
Family member# Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)		.022				.023	-.154
		(.060)				(.060)	(.143)
High-level convictions/population			-.050*				
			(.022)				
Defendant#High-level convictions/population			.264**				
			(.072)				
Family member#High-level convictions/population			.051				
			(.077)				
Long-term internment/population				-.243*			
				(.087)			
Defendant# Long-term internment/population				1.129*			
				(.365)			
Family member# Long-term internment/population				.277			
				(.404)			
Total internment/population					-.145*		
					(.052)		
Defendant#Total internment/population					.670*		
					(.216)		
Family member#Total internment/population					.167		
					(.241)		
US zone							-.032
							(.035)
French_zone							-.236#
							(.128)
Defendant # US zone							.124
							(.085)
Defendant # French_zone							-.595
							(.337)
Family member # US zone							.211#
							(.104)
Family member # French_zone							-.345
							(.205)
Unemployment (1956)	.004#	.005#	.005#	.005#	.005#	.004	.011*
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.005)
NSDAP vote share July 1932	-.010	-.018	-.036	-.022	-.022		-.109
	(.112)	(.112)	(.086)	(.084)	(.084)		(.067)
NSDAP vote share November 1932						-.092	
						(.114)	

Refugees (%)	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.002	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Respondent=refugee	-.018	-.017	-.017	-.017	-.017	-.017	-.017
	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,939	1,939	1,939	1,939	1,939	1,939	1,939
R-squared	.113	.116	.118	.117	.117	.117	.121

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors (clustered at the Land-level).in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

The first two models in Table A6 present the regressions that are the basis for Figures 1, 2 and 3 in the main paper and Figure A1 in the appendix.

The next three models use alternative measures of TJ punishments as robustness checks for our main findings. In model 3 we use the proportion of high-level convictions (i.e. Major Offender, Offenders and Minor Offenders but excluding Fellow Travelers), in model 4 we use the Land-level *long-term internments* in prison camps as a proportion of the population, while in model 5 we use Land-level *total internments* in prison camps as a proportion of the population. All three models confirm the patterns in our main analysis: at low levels of Land-level punishments, the coefficient for defendants was negative and statistically significant (indicating a democratic support deficit.) However, due to the positive and statistically significant interaction between punishment levels and the TJ defendant indicator, the anti-democratic effects among defendants diminished and lost statistical significance at high levels at Land-level punishments.

In model 6 we check the robustness of our results to using NSDAP vote share in the November 1932 elections (instead of the July 1932 elections) and find very similar results to those in the baseline specification in model 2.

Finally, in model 7 we present the results of a model specification where we control for occupation zones interacted with the defendant and family members dummy variables. Doing so essentially controls for any differences between the three Western occupation zones, which could confound the relationship between TJ procedures, TJ outcomes and democracy support. The coefficients in model 7 confirm that even once we account for other cross-zone differences, the anti-democratic effects on TJ defendants were much more pronounced in parts of Germany where defendants experienced worse TJ outcome fairness and lower procedural justice. While these results need to be interpreted very cautiously, since model 7 suffers from very high multi-collinearity (because TJ procedures and TJ outcomes are highly correlated with occupation zone), they nevertheless increase our confidence in the robustness of our findings.

Table A7: Alternative specifications and statistical modeling approaches

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Defendant	-.083*	-.198**	-.083**	-.198**	-.194**	-.192**	
	(.027)	(.044)	(.025)	(.054)	(.041)	(.044)	
Family member	-.071**	-.101#	-.071**	-.101*	-.099#	-.108#	
	(.023)	(.053)	(.022)	(.043)	(.053)	(.053)	
Procedural justice index	.039	.027	.039	.027	.024	.021	.027
	(.030)	(.035)	(.030)	(.032)	(.034)	(.044)	(.035)
Defendant# Procedural justice index		.110#		.110	.116#	.073	
		(.055)		(.105)	(.055)	(.043)	
Family member# Procedural justice index		.085		.085	.082	.131	
		(.099)		(.082)	(.097)	(.075)	
Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)	-.014	-.026	-.014	-.026	-.030#	-.026	-.026
	(.014)	(.016)	(.017)	(.018)	(.016)	(.018)	(.016)
Defendant# Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)		.185**		.185*	.190**	.182**	
		(.048)		(.073)	(.041)	(.049)	
Family member# Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)		.022		.022	.030	.022	
		(.060)		(.063)	(.059)	(.064)	
Defendant (alt)							-.178**
							(.035)
Family member (alt)							-.110#
							(.051)
Defendant (alt) # Procedural justice index							.086
							(.054)
Family member (alt)# Procedural justice index							.099
							(.101)
Defendant (alt)# Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)							.159**
							(.042)
Family member (alt) # Outcome fairness (Total convictions/population)							.032
							(.056)
Unemployment (1956)	.004#	.005#	.004	.005	.012	.004#	.005#
	(.002)	(.002)	(.004)	(.004)	(.007)	(.002)	(.002)
NSDAP vote share July 1932	-.010	-.018	-.010	-.018	-.026	.007	-.019
	(.112)	(.112)	(.111)	(.111)	(.113)	(.137)	(.113)
Refugees (%)	.001	.001	.001	.001	.000	.001	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.001)
Respondent=refugee	-.018	-.017	-.018	-.017	-.012	-.017	-.017
	(.015)	(.015)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.015)	(.015)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Model type	OLS	OLS	HLM	HLM	OLS	OLS	OLS
Observations	1,939	1,939	1,939	1,939	1,834	1,916	1,939
R-squared	.113	.117	N/A	N/A	.116	.117	.116

Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

In Table A7 we present a few additional robustness checks. The first two models simply reproduce the baseline models (models 1-2 from Table A6) to facilitate comparisons.

Models 3&4 present the results of random-intercept hierarchical linear models (HLM) using the same model specifications as the baseline models. While the standard errors for a few of the estimates are somewhat larger than for the OLS models with clustered standard errors, the overall patterns are very similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.

Models 5&6 test whether our main results in model 2 are robust to excluding two regions (Saarland in model 5 and Berlin in model 6) where TJ statistics were not available in the same format as for the other Lander, and were therefore calculated by the authors (as described in the notes to Table A1). The results for the main variables of interest are very similar to those in the baseline specification in model 2.

Finally, in model 7 we use an alternative definition of the TJ defendant and family member variables: unlike in the baseline models, we reclassify single and divorced women over the age of 30 as TJ defendants rather than family members (to account for the possibility that in such cases saying that their family was affected by denazification was more likely to mean that the respondent herself was a defendant.) While the results are very similar to those in model 2, the difference between the coefficients for defendants and family members was somewhat smaller, which suggests that our baseline categorization is more accurate.




Figure A1 is based on the regression in model 1 of Table A6 and shows the predicted value and 90% confidence intervals of democracy support for defendants, family members, and the general public. The results suggest that overall democratic support was indeed significantly lower among both TJ defendants and family members than among the general public. Moreover, it is worth noting that the differences in democratic support between defendants and family members were small and statistically insignificant.




Figure A2 uses the regression results from the same model used to create Figures 1&2 in the main paper (model 2 in Table A6), but predicts the effect of defendant status on democratic support at the Land-specific levels of procedural justice and outcome fairness. The figure illustrates the heterogeneity of defendant status effects as a function of the Denazification context: whereas in several Lander of the British zone (especially Niedersachsen, Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen), characterized by low procedural justice and low outcome fairness, defendants were significantly less democratic than other German citizens, the effects disappeared almost completely in areas characterized by either high procedural justice and moderate outcome fairness (as in Baden in the French zone) or by low procedural justice and very high outcome fairness (as in Bayern and Hessen in the US zone).