Programme

Please note that programme is subject to change.
All talks take place at Faculty of Philosophy. Radcliffe Humanities, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6GG.

Friday 11th November
15.30-17.30
Keynote (jointly with the Jowett Society): There is a joint in nature between cognition and perception even though cognitive penetration is rife and there is no modularity of mind
Ned Block (NYU)
Chair: Sam Clarke
Lecture Room
17.30
Drinks Reception
Saturday 12th November
9.30-11.00
Is it insulting to reject testimony?
Finlay Malcolm (University of Manchester)
Respondent: Lucy Campbell
Chair: Lilith Newton
COLIN MATTHEWS ROOM
What about causal determinism can explain privation of responsibility?
Kelson Law (University of Pittsburgh)
Respondent: Yuuki Ohta
Chair: Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
RYLE ROOM
11.00-11.30
Coffee and Tea Break
11.30-13.00
How might compensation form a part of the negative duty not to harm, in the case of global poverty?
Leonie Smith (St Andrews, Manchester)
Respondent: Jeff McMahan
Chair: Sybilla Pereira
COLIN MATTHEWS ROOM
Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism
Virginia Schultheis (MIT)
Respondent: Timothy Williamson
Chair: Annina Loets
RYLE ROOM
13.00-14.30
Lunch Break
14.30-16.00
On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactuals
Alex Kocurek (UC Berkeley)
Respondent: Alex Paseau
Chair: Alex Roberts
COLIN MATTHEWS ROOM
The Inimitable Function of Memory
Arieh Schwartz (UC Davis)
Respondent: Cressida Gaukroger
Chair: Sam Clarke
RYLE ROOM
16.00-16.30
Coffee and Tea Break
16.30-18.00
Keynote: What is doing the explaining? An atomistic idea.
Barbara Sattler (St. Andrew's)
Chair: Malte Bischof
LECTURE ROOM
19.30
Conference Dinner
Sunday 13th November
9.30-11.00
How we shouldn't aggregate claims and complaints
Daniel Ramöller (Stockholm University)
Respondent: Teru Thomas
Chair: Kacper Kowalczyk
COLIN MATTHEWS ROOM
What the Future "Might" Brings
David Boylan (MIT)
Respondent: Timothy Williamson
Chair: Caleb Layton
RYLE ROOM
11.00-11.30
Coffee and Tea Break
11.30-13.00
Can an Atheist know that he exists? Cogito and God in Descartes's Meditations
Jan Forsman (University of Tampere)
Respondent: Paul Lodge
Chair: Lilith Newton
COLIN MATTHEWS ROOM
Getting Away With Murder: Why virtual murder is deontologically wrong
Helen Ryland (University of Birmingham)
Respondent: Thomas Douglas
Chair: Gary O'Brien
RYLE ROOM
13.00-14.30
Lunch Break
14.30-16.00
How Many Noses Did Socrates Have? Aristotle's distinction between two kinds of repetition and the solution to the problem of babbling in the Topics
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt)
Respondent: Michail Perimatzis
Chair: Malte Bischof
COLIN MATTHEWS ROOM
How a Necessary Fact Can Ground a Contingent Fact
Fatema Amijee (UT Austin)
Respondent: Ofra Magidor
Chair: Jon Andersson
RYLE ROOM
16.00-16.30
Coffee and Tea Break
16.30-18.00
Keynote speech: Death, Deprivation, and Rational Regret
Shelly Kagan (Yale)
Chair: Ben Lange
LECTURE ROOM