INEXPRESSIBILITY AND REFLECTION

in the formal sciences

INEXPRESSIBILITY AND REFLECTION

in the formal sciences

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS SEMINAR:

MONDAYS, 4:30 pm, RYLE ROOM, PHILOSOPHY CENTRE (unless otherwise indicated),

RADCLIFFE HUMANITIES, WOODSTOCK ROAD

Conveners: Prof. Volker Halbach (<volker.halbach@philosophy.ox.ac.uk>)

Dr. Daniel Isaacson (<daniel.isaacson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk>)

Dr. James Studd (<james.studd@philosophy.ox.ac.uk>)

TRINITY TERM 2014

W1, 28 Apr: Timothy Williamson (Oxford)

W3, 12 May: Matthias Schirn (Munich), Logical Abstraction and Logical Objects

W?, Brendan Larvor (Hertfordshire)

Hilary Term 2014

W3, 3 Feb: Øystein Linnebo (Oslo), Parsons on Modality in Mathematics

W5, 17 Feb: Andrew Irvine (UBC), Categoricity and Alethic Modality

W6, 24 Feb: Peter Aczel (Manchester), The Structure Identity Principle in Set Theory and Type Theory

W8, 10 Mar: Julien Murzi (Kent/Munich), A Note on Instability and Revenge

Michaelmas 2013:

W2, 21 Oct: Jon Litland (Oslo), The Downwards Justification Procedure and the Completeness and Stability of Intuitionistic Logic

(This meeting will take place in the Seminar Room on the 3rd floor of the Radcliffe Humanities Building, rather than the Ryle Room)

W4, 4 Nov: Robbie Williams (Leeds), Rational Illogicality

W6, 18 Nov: Graham Leigh (Oxford), What’s in a T-sentence?

W8, 2 Dec: Nicholas Jones (Merton), Representors and Artefacts

Trinity Term 2013

W1, 22 Apr: Eckehart Koehler (Vienna), Goedel vs. Carnap on Logical Syntax

W2, 29 Apr: Tatiana Arrigoni (Trento), The Hyperuniverse Program: mathematical and philosophical aspects

W3, 6 May: James Studd (Oxford), Abstraction Reconceptualized

W4, 13 May: Jeffrey Ketland (Oxford), Leibniz Equivalence (GRADUATE TRAINING ROOM, GROUND FLOOR)

W5, 20 May:

2-4 pm Kobi Kremnitzer (Oxford), What is Geometry? (SEMINAR ROOM, 3rd FLOOR)

4:30-6:30 pm David Corfield (Kent), What might philosophy make of homotopy type theory? (RYLE ROOM)

W6, 27 May: Kentaro Fujimoto (Bristol), Some miscellaneous topics from the problem of implicit commitment in accepting set theory

W7, 3 Jun: Albert Visser (Utrecht) , Inconsistency Statements

W8, 10 Jun: Marianna Antonutti (Bristol), Human effective computability and Absolute Undecidability

Hilary Term 2013

W1, 14 Jan: Samson Abramsky (Oxford), Intensionality, definability and computation

W3, 28 Jan: Philip Welch (Bristol), Conceptual Structuralism

W5, 11 Feb: Richard Kaye (Birmingham), Adding Standardness to Nonstandard Models

W6, 18 Feb: Robert Thomas (Manitoba), Modality in Mathematics: Possibilities for whom?

W7, 25 Feb: Ole Thomassen Hjortland (Munich), Truth, Paracompleteness and Substructural Logics

Michaelmas Term 2012

W1, 8 Oct: Ralf Schindler (Münster), Dilemmas and Truths in Set Theory

W2, 15 October: Anton Setzer (Swansea), Proof theory of Martin-Loef Type Theory

W3, 22 October: no seminar (RI opening)

W4, 29 October: Karl-Georg Niebergall (Berlin), On the underdetermination of theories

W5, 5 November: Peter Hacker (Oxford), Wittgenstein on the nature of proof in mathematics.

W6, 12 Nov: Toby Meadows (Bristol), Sets, supersets and closure

W7, 19 Nov: Boris Zilber (Oxford), On continuity and its alternatives

W8, 26 Nov: Paul Egré (Paris), Borel on the Heap

Trinity Term 2012

W1, 23 Apr: “Third New College Logic Meeting”

W2, 30 Apr: Walter Dean (Warwick), Dedekind's Categoricity Theorem, induction, and mathematical communication

W3, 7 May: Alan Weir (Glasgow), Can formalism be revived?

W5, 21 May: Andrew Bacon (Oxford), A general approach to revenge paradoxes

W6, 28 May: Alan Baker (Oxford), Making sense of mathematical counterfactuals

W7, 4 June: Felix Mühlhölzer (Göttingen), How arithmetic is about numbers. A Wittgensteinian perspective

W8, 11 June: Alex Paseau (Oxford), Some remarks on proof and non-deductive evidence in mathematics

Hilary Term 2012

W1, 16 Jan: Timothy Williamson (Oxford), Informal Validity and Intended Models in Modal Logic

W2, 23 Jan, Gabriel Uzquiano (USC), Indefinite Extensibility Revisited

W2, 24 Jan, 2-4 pm, EXAMINATION SCHOOLS, Juliette Kennedy (Helsinki):

W2, 24 Jan, 4:30-6:30 pm, Jouko Väänänen (Helsinki), Second order logic, set theory and foundations of mathematics

W3, 30 Jan, Peter Schuster (Leeds), Proof, Computation, Preservation: a Case Study from Algebra

W4, 6 Feb, Kobi Kremnitzer (Oxford), Homotopy Type Theory: a new language for mathematics

W5, 13 Feb, Kentaro Sato (Bern), N versus the other Infinite

W6, 20 Feb, Christopher von Bülow (Konstanz), Shapiro’s and Hellman’s Structuralism (Abstract)

W7, 27 Feb: Salvatore Florio (Birkbeck, Kansas State), Semantics and the Plural Conception of Reality

W8, 5 Mar: Benedikt Löwe (Hamburg), Formalization is Idealization

Michelmas Term 2011

W1, 10 Oct: Lev Beklemishev (Lomonossov University Moscow), Provability Algebras: a Survey

W2, 17 Oct: Alex Paseau (Oxford), Mathematical Knowledge without Proof

W3, 24 Oct: Richard Pettigrew (Bristol), Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism (Abstract)

W4, 31 Oct: Timothy Bays (Notre Dame), Some Remarks on the Foundations of Arithmetic

W5, 7 Nov: Luca Incurvati, The Graph Conception of Set

W6, 14 Nov: Peter Schroeder-Heister (Tübingen), Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Self-Contradiction and the Format of Deductive Reasoning

W7, TUESDAY 22 Nov: Michael Rathjen (Leeds), On the (Unreasonable?) Effectiveness of Ideal Elements

W8, 28 Nov: Sean Walsh (Birkbeck College), Knowledge and Schemata

Trinity Term 2011

W1: Daniel Isaacson, What is Achieved by Zermelo’s proof of quasi-categoricity of second-order ZF?

W2a: Philip Welch, A Reflection Principle implying PD

W2b: Dirk Van Dalen, Brower’s Notion of Choice Sequence

W3: Mathieu Marion, Wittgenstein and Goodstein on the Equation Calculus and Uniqueness Rule

W4: Richard Heck, The Strength of Truth Theories

W5: Hannes Leitgeb, A Theory of Truth for Propositions

W6: Lev Beklemishev, On Provability Algebras for Theories of Iterated Truth

W7: John Burgess, Structure and Rigor

W8: Stewart Shapiro, Open Texture, Computability and Church’s Thesis

Hilary Term 2011

Week 1: Ian Rumfitt, Determinacy and Bivalence in Set Theory

Week 2: Albert Visser, Sameness of Theories

Week 3: Jeffrey Ketland, Nominalistic Adequacy

Week 4: Volker Halbach, T-sentences

Week 5: Ed Zalta, A Defense of Logicism

Week 6: Øystein Linnebo, Absolute but Indefinite Generality

Week 7: Antony Anderson, Church-Frege intensional logic with an application to Bolzano’s proof that there are infinite multiplicities

Week 8: Leon Horsten, The Absolutely Infinite