Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics at Oxford

 

Philosophy of Mathematics seminar

Philosophy and Mathematics undergraduate course

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Logic Seminar in the Mathematical Institute

Faculty of Philosophy

 
 

Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar

We meet on Mondays at 4:30 pm in the Ryle Room of the Philosophy Centre unless otherwise indicated .

Conveners: Volker Halbach, Daniel Isaacson, and James Studd

We urge that participants abide by the Guidelines for respectful, constructive, and inclusive philosophical discussion


Trinity 2017

Week 1 (24 April) Ursula Martin (Mathematical Institute, and Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford), Crafting the mathematical machine

Week 1 (Thursday, 27 April) Peter Hylton (Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago), Analyticity, yet again, 4.30-6.30 p.m., Thursday, in the Lecture Room of the Radcliffe Humanities Building, Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6GG

Week 3 (8 May) Damian Rössler (Mathematical Institute, Oxford University), A few remarks on the development of mathematical theories

Week 4 (15 May) Ian Rumfitt (All Souls College, Oxford), Neo-Fregeanism and the Burali-Forti Paradox


Hilary 2017

Week 2 (23 January) Volker Halbach (Oxford), The substitutional theory of logical consequence  

Week 3 (30 January) Catrin Campbell-Moore (Bristol), Limits in the Revision Theory 

Week 5 (13 February) Doukas Kapantais (Athens), “Consistency, a catchword making the second incompleteness theorem more spectacular than the first.” Comments on a comment by Georg Kreisel 

Week 6 (20 February) Øystein Linnebo (Oslo), Generality explained: A truth-maker semantics

Week 8 (6 March) Donald Gillies (King’s College London), An Aristotelian approach for contemporary mathematics 


Michaelmas 2016

Week 1 (10 October) Fenner Tanswell (Oxford), Proof, Rigour and Mathematical Virtues

Week 2 (17 October) Thomas Schindler (Cambridge), Deflationism, Classes, and the Epistemology of Arithmetic

Week 4 (31 October) Johannes Stern (Bristol), The Sky is the Limit: Reconsidering the Equivalence Scheme

Week 5 (7 November) Crispin Wright (NYU), Intuitionism and the Sorites

Week 7 (21 November) Walter Dean (Warwick), Incompleteness via paradox (and completeness)


Trinity 2016

Week 2 (2 May): Graham E Leigh (Technische Universität Wien), The Simple Truth

Week 3 (9 May): Dana Scott (Carnegie Mellon and UC Berkeley), Why Mathematical Proof?

Week 7 (6 June): James Studd (Oxford), The Caesar problem – towards a piecemeal solution

Week 8 (13 June): Janine Gühler (Oxford), Aristotle on mathematical truth


Hilary 2016

W2 (25 January): Alex Paseau (Oxford), Capturing consequence

W5 (15 February): Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin), Collections

W7 (29 February): Leon Horsten (Bristol), On the logic of truth

W8 (7 March): Marcus Giaquinto (University College London), Mathematical proof: assessment of an empirical contribution to a philosophical dispute

Michaelmas 2015

W2 (19 October): Jeremy Gray (Open University and Warwick), Weyl and meaning

W3 (26 October): Andrew Arana (University of Paris 1), Non- Euclidean geometry and geometrical content

W6 (16 November): Alf Coles (Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol), A relational view of the concept of number; pedagogical, neuroscientific, and philosophical considerations

W7 (23 November): Adrian Mathias (Cambridge and La Réunion), The silence. (This talk will be about the Cambridge reaction to Gödel's discoveries of 1930/31)  

W7 (26 November): Benedikt Löwe (Cambridge and Amsterdam), Modal logic and Multiverses. This talk is joint with the Logic Seminar and will take place in the Mathematical Institute C5 (next door to the Radcliffe Humanities Building).

W8 (30 Nov): Juliette Kennedy (Cambridge and Helsinki), Entanglement and Formalism Freeness Revisited: Templates From Logic and Set Theory

Trinity 2015

W2: Kai Wehmeier, Truth in Modal Language

W5: Michael Sheard, Weak Deflationism and a Transactional Approach to Truth

W7: Owen Griffiths (joint with Alex Paseau), In Defence of Isomorphism Invariance

W8: Jonathan Payne, Absolute Generality and Expressibility

Hilary 2015

W1: Volker Halbach, Three Levels of Intensionality

W3: Peter Koepke, Natural Formalism

W5: Albert Visser, Collection, Lemmas, Reflection

W7: John Crossley, Programs from Proofs

W8: Matti Eklund, Incoherentism about Vagueness

27 Mar: Paolo Mancosu, In good company?  On Hume’s Principle and assignment of numbers to infinite concept

Michaelmas 2014

W0, 6 Oct, 11am-1pm, Colin Matthew Room: Oswaldo Chateaubriand, Objects, Properties, and Structures

W2, 20 Oct: Kobi Kremnitzer, Towards a Neo-Pragmatist Philosophy of (Pure) Mathematics

W4: Gabriel Uzquiano, Class Forms of Cantor’s Theorem

W6: John Wigglesworth, Naive Modal Set Theory

W7: Leon Horsten, Set Probabilities

Trinity Term 2014

W1, 28 Apr: Timothy Williamson (Oxford), Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology
W3, 12 May: Matthias Schirn (Munich), Logical Abstraction and Logical Objects
W5, 26 May: Carlo Nicolai (Oxford), Notes on Typed Truth and Consistency Assertions
W7, 9 Jun: Brendan Larvor (Hertfordshire), The Logic of Informal Proofs

Hilary Term 2014

W3, 3 Feb: Øystein Linnebo (Oslo), Parsons on Modality in Mathematics
W5, 17 Feb: Andrew Irvine (UBC), Categoricity and Alethic Modality
W6, 24 Feb: Peter Aczel (Manchester), The Structure Identity Principle in Set Theory and Type Theory
W8, 10 Mar: Julien Murzi (Kent/Munich), A Note on Instability and Revenge

Michaelmas Term 2013:

W2, 21 Oct: Jon Litland (Oslo), The Downwards Justification Procedure and the Completeness and Stability of Intuitionistic Logic
(This meeting will take place in the Seminar Room on the 3rd floor of the Radcliffe Humanities Building, rather than the Ryle Room)

W4, 4 Nov: Robbie Williams (Leeds), Rational Illogicality
W6, 18 Nov: Graham Leigh (Oxford), What’s in a T-sentence?
W8, 2 Dec: Nicholas Jones (Merton), Representors and Artefacts

Trinity Term 2013

W1, 22 Apr: Eckehart Koehler (Vienna), Goedel vs. Carnap on Logical Syntax
W2, 29 Apr: Tatiana Arrigoni (Trento), The Hyperuniverse Program: mathematical and philosophical aspects
W3, 6 May: James Studd (Oxford), Abstraction Reconceptualized
W4, 13 May: Jeffrey Ketland (Oxford), Leibniz Equivalence (GRADUATE TRAINING ROOM, GROUND FLOOR)
W5, 20 May: 2-4 pm Kobi Kremnitzer (Oxford), What is Geometry? (SEMINAR ROOM, 3rd FLOOR)
4:30-6:30 pm David Corfield (Kent), What might philosophy make of homotopy type theory? (RYLE ROOM)
W6, 27 May: Kentaro Fujimoto (Bristol), Some miscellaneous topics from the problem of implicit commitment in accepting set theory
W7, 3 Jun: Albert Visser (Utrecht) , Inconsistency Statements
W8, 10 Jun: Marianna Antonutti (Bristol), Human effective computability and Absolute Undecidability

Hilary Term 2013

W1, 14 Jan: Samson Abramsky (Oxford), Intensionality, definability and computation
W3, 28 Jan: Philip Welch (Bristol), Conceptual Structuralism
W5, 11 Feb: Richard Kaye (Birmingham), Adding Standardness to Nonstandard Models
W6, 18 Feb: Robert Thomas (Manitoba), Modality in Mathematics: Possibilities for whom?
W7, 25 Feb: Ole Thomassen Hjortland (Munich), Truth, Paracompleteness and Substructural Logics

Michaelmas Term 2012

W1, 8 Oct: Ralf Schindler (Münster), Dilemmas and Truths in Set Theory
W2, 15 October: Anton Setzer (Swansea), Proof theory of Martin-Loef Type Theory
W3, 22 October: no seminar (RI opening)
W4, 29 October: Karl-Georg Niebergall (Berlin), On the underdetermination of theories
W5, 5 November: Peter Hacker (Oxford), Wittgenstein on the nature of proof in mathematics.
W6, 12 Nov: Toby Meadows (Bristol), Sets, supersets and closure
W7, 19 Nov: Boris Zilber (Oxford), On continuity and its alternatives
W8, 26 Nov: Paul Egré (Paris), Borel on the Heap

Trinity Term 2012

W1, 23 Apr: “Third New College Logic Meeting”
W2, 30 Apr: Walter Dean (Warwick), Dedekind's Categoricity Theorem, induction, and mathematical communication
W3, 7 May: Alan Weir (Glasgow), Can formalism be revived?
W5, 21 May: Andrew Bacon (Oxford), A general approach to revenge paradoxes
W6, 28 May: Alan Baker (Oxford), Making sense of mathematical counterfactuals
W7, 4 June: Felix Mühlhölzer (Göttingen), How arithmetic is about numbers. A Wittgensteinian perspective
W8, 11 June: Alex Paseau (Oxford), Some remarks on proof and non-deductive evidence in mathematics

Hilary Term 2012

W1, 16 Jan: Timothy Williamson (Oxford), Informal Validity and Intended Models in Modal Logic
W2, 23 Jan, Gabriel Uzquiano (USC), Indefinite Extensibility Revisited
W2, 24 Jan, 2-4 pm, EXAMINATION SCHOOLS, Juliette Kennedy (Helsinki):
Change the Logic, Change the Meaning? Quine’s Dictum and the Case of Set theory
W2, 24 Jan, 4:30-6:30 pm, Jouko Väänänen (Helsinki), Second order logic, set theory and foundations of mathematics
W3, 30 Jan, Peter Schuster (Leeds), Proof, Computation, Preservation: a Case Study from Algebra
W4, 6 Feb, Kobi Kremnitzer (Oxford), Homotopy Type Theory: a new language for mathematics
W5, 13 Feb, Kentaro Sato (Bern), N versus the other Infinite
W6, 20 Feb, Christopher von Bülow (Konstanz), Shapiro’s and Hellman’s Structuralism (Abstract)
W7, 27 Feb: Salvatore Florio (Birkbeck, Kansas State), Semantics and the Plural Conception of Reality
W8, 5 Mar: Benedikt Löwe (Hamburg), Formalization is Idealization

Michelmas Term 2011

W1, 10 Oct: Lev Beklemishev (Lomonossov University Moscow), Provability Algebras: a Survey
W2, 17 Oct: Alex Paseau (Oxford), Mathematical Knowledge without Proof
W3, 24 Oct: Richard Pettigrew (Bristol), Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism (Abstract)
W4, 31 Oct: Timothy Bays (Notre Dame), Some Remarks on the Foundations of Arithmetic
W5, 7 Nov: Luca Incurvati, The Graph Conception of Set
W6, 14 Nov: Peter Schroeder-Heister (Tübingen), Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Self-Contradiction and the Format of Deductive Reasoning
W7, TUESDAY 22 Nov: Michael Rathjen (Leeds), On the (Unreasonable?) Effectiveness of Ideal Elements
W8, 28 Nov: Sean Walsh (Birkbeck College), Knowledge and Schemata

Trinity Term 2011

W1: Daniel Isaacson, What is Achieved by Zermelo’s proof of quasi-categoricity of second-order ZF?
W2a: Philip Welch, A Reflection Principle implying PD
W2b: Dirk Van Dalen, Brower’s Notion of Choice Sequence
W3: Mathieu Marion, Wittgenstein and Goodstein on the Equation Calculus and Uniqueness Rule
W4: Richard Heck, The Strength of Truth Theories
W5: Hannes Leitgeb, A Theory of Truth for Propositions
W6: Lev Beklemishev, On Provability Algebras for Theories of Iterated Truth
W7: John Burgess, Structure and Rigor
W8: Stewart Shapiro, Open Texture, Computability and Church’s Thesis

Hilary Term 2011

W1: Ian Rumfitt, Determinacy and Bivalence in Set Theory
W2: Albert Visser, Sameness of Theories
W3: Jeffrey Ketland, Nominalistic Adequacy
W4: Volker Halbach, T-sentences
W5: Ed Zalta, A Defense of Logicism
W6: Øystein Linnebo, Absolute but Indefinite Generality
W7: Antony Anderson, Church-Frege intensional logic with an application to Bolzano’s proof that there are infinite multiplicities
W8: Leon Horsten, The Absolutely Infinite

 

last change: 11 April, 2017