Tutorial Fellow, Merton College and Department of Economics, University of Oxford
Visiting Fellow, Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science
Primary focus: AI for economic research. Secondary: social and economic impacts of AI.
Participants are offered lunches and accommodation for the duration of the workshop.
Travel costs are not covered.
Application deadline: December 15, 2025
To apply, and for further details, please visit the workshop website.
Kenotes
We show that for any ϵ>0, as the number of agents gets large, the share of games that admit a pure ϵ-equilibrium converges to 1. The asymptotic share of games that admit a pure Nash equilibrium (i.e. ϵ=0) is approximately 1-1/e. Conclusion: very small deviations from perfect rationality suffice to ensure the general existence of stable outcomes.
We bring the decision theoretic notion of satisficing, according to which agents play good but not necessarily their best action, to games. We provide static and dynamic foundations for the concept, and consider applications.
Among generic games that have a pure Nash equilibrium, all but a small fraction are connected, i.e. every non-Nash profile can reach every Nash via directed best-response paths. Implication: there are simple adaptive dynamics that converge almost surely to a pure Nash equilibrium in all but a small fraction of generic games that have one. This limits the scope of known impossibility results about learning pure Nash.
We characterize the outcomes of a canonical theoretical model of the intergenerational transmission of capital that features differential fertility. We establish easy-to-verify conditions on the primitives to guarantee global convergence to degenerate or atomless steady state distributions of capital.
International Journal of Game Theory 2023
articleWhen played according to a fixed cyclic order, the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a vanishingly small proportion of all large generic games.
European Economic Review 2019
articleWe evaluate the general equilibrium impact on aggregate emissions of taxing the emissions of any set of sectors in an intersectoral production network.
Games and Economic Behavior 2018
article code minor correctionIn any symmetric equilibrium of the pure location game, as the number of firms becomes large, the market share distribution converges to a Gamma(2,2) distribution. The result holds regardless of the distribution of consumers.
Games and Economic Behavior 2017
article code appendixDynamic network formation model on a fixed number of nodes and overlapping social groups. Homophily can be non-monotonic over time.
Mathematical Social Sciences 2016
articleInterpreting the Sure-Thing Principle as a counterfactual proposition resolves issues with the original “agreeing to disagree” result.