Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it
Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, Oxford University Press

Practical reason: rationality or normativity but not both
Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Change and Kurt Sylvan, Routledge

A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?
Analytic Philosophy
, 57 (2016), pp. 1-14
The theory of deontic modality within linguistics offers an account of the meaning of normative terms including 'ought'. How should the philosophy of normativity be affected by this theory? I argue that it should not be affected much. Indeed the theory of deontic modality needs some correction from the philosophy of normativity;
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Philosophical Studies
, 173 (2016), pp. 3369-3371 and 3431-3448
Contributions to a symposium on my book Rationality Through Reasoning, responding to Paul Boghossian, Garrett Cullity, Philip Pettit and Nicholas Southwood.
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Précis of Rationality Through Reasoning

Contributions to a symposium on my book Rationality Through Reasoning, responding to comments by Olav Gjelsvik, María José Frápolli and Neftalí Villanueva, Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, Miranda del Corral, Fernando Broncano and Jesús Vega, and Nicholas Shackel.  
Teorema, 34 (2015), pp. 99-103 and 191-209

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Précis of Rationality Through Reasoning
Responses to Setiya, Hussain and Horty
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
, 91 (2015), pp. 200-3 and 230-42
Contributions to a symposium on my book Rationality Through Reasoning
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Reason versus ought
Philosophical Issues
, 25 (2015), pp. 80-97
Which is the more fundamental feature of normativity; reason or ought? This paper sets up two parallel ontologies for normativity: in one reason is fundamental and in the other ought. It argues that the ought ontology is more faithful to our ordinary normative concepts.
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Rationality Through Reasoning
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought. Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us. Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought. Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else. Offers a new answer to the ‘motivation question’ of how a normative belief motivates an action.
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Organon F, 20 (2013), pp. 425-36
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Williams on ought
In Luck, Value and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, edited by Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 247-65

In 2002, Bernard Williams delivered a lecture that revisited the arguments of his article 'Ought and moral obligation', published in his Moral Luck. The lecture attributed to the earlier article the thesis that there are no ‘personal’ or (as I put it) ‘owned’ oughts. It also rejected this thesis. This paper explains the idea of an owned ought, and supports Williams’s lecture in asserting that there are owned oughts. It also examines the question of how accurately Williams’s later lecture interprets his earlier article.

In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O'Connor and Constantine Sandis, Blackwell, 2010, pp. 285-92

Is rationality normative?

, 11 (2008), pp. 153-71

Does rationality consist in responding correctly to reasons?
Journal of Moral Philosophy
, 4 (2007), pp. 349-74
Reprinted in Studies in Moral Philosophy, 1 (2011), pp. 25-55
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In Homage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, edited by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, 2007,
Expressions such as ‘morality requires’, ‘prudence requires’ and ‘rationality requires’ are ambiguous. ‘Morality’, ‘prudence’ and ‘rationality’ may refer either to properties of a person, or to sources of requirements. Consequently, ‘requires’ has a ‘property sense’ and a ‘source sense’. I offer a semantic system for its source sense. Then I consider the logical form of conditional requirements, in the source sense.
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