Paul Lodge - abstracts of papers

Abstracts

“Leibniz on Infinite Analysis, Lucky Proof, and Guaranteed Proof,” (with Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra), Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2011), 222-36.

Abstract:
According to one of Leibniz’s theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof, namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Proof. We argue that Leibniz has an answer to these problems since for him one has not proved that ‘Peter denies Christ’ unless one has also proved that ‘Peter’ is a consistent concept, an impossible task since it requires the full decomposition of the infinite concept ‘Peter’. We defend this view from objections found in the literature and maintain that for Leibniz all truths about created individual beings are contingent.

Abstract:
In discussion of Leibniz's philosophical methodology Donald Rutherford defends the view that Leibniz regarded metaphysics as an a priori demonstrative science. In the course of this discussion he isolates and tries to deflect a significant challenge for his view, namely the observation that in many of his mature writings on metaphysics Leibniz appears to defend his views by means of a posteriori arguments. I present some prima facie difficulties with Rutherford's position and then offer an alternative account of how Leibniz thought he needed to establish metaphysical claims. My suggestion is that the challenge that Rutherford poses may be best answered by attending to the fact that Leibniz recognized a kind of metaphysical enquiry, 'real metaphysics', that is essentially a posteriori, in virtue of the fact that it is concerned not just with possible kinds of beings, but with the kinds of beings that God actually created.

"Unconscious Conceiving and Leibniz's Argument for Primitive Conceptson,”(with Stephen Puryear) Studia Leibnitiana 28/29 (2006-07), 178-96.

Abstract:
In a recent paper, Dennis Plaisted examines an important argument that Leibniz gives for the existence of primitive concepts. Plaisted concentrates on a version of the argument found in a piece from the late 1670s called Of an Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking. However, truncated versions of essentially the same argument can be found in several other writings from the period. Plaisted begins his treatment by sketching a natural reading of Leibniz's argument. He points out that, on this reading, the argument implies something clearly inconsistent with Leibniz's other views. To save Leibniz from contradiction, Plaisted offers a revision. However, his account faces a number of serious difficulties and therefore does not successfully eliminate the inconsistency. We explain these difficulties and propose a more plausible alternative. Whilst our paper is constructed around a critique of Plaisted's article, it has a broader scope. For in responding to the interesting problem that he identifies, we discuss in detail the neglected topic of Leibniz's views on the nature of conceiving and, in the process, we bring to light his commitment to the somewhat surprising thesis that one can conceive something through a concept even if one has no conscious grasp of that concept.

"Garber’s Interpretations of Leibniz on Corporeal Substance in the 'Middle Years'," The Leibniz Review (2005), 1-27.

Abstract
In 1985 Daniel Garber published his highly influential paper "Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years". In response to much discussion and debate, Garber's position has gone through a number of changes and in two recent articles, "Leibniz and Fardella: Body, Substance and Idealism," (2004) and "Leibniz and Idealism," (2005), he has returned to these issues. Garber 2004 is partly autobiographical and I suggest that some elements in Garber's characterization of the debate may not be entirely accurate. But I also discuss two further issues. A feature of Garber's current position is that we should perhaps conclude that Leibniz did not have a view concerning his ultimate ontology of substance during his middle years. I am interested in the viability of this position and some more general methodological issues that arise from Garber's willingness to embrace this kind of agnosticism on Leibniz's behalf (albeit tentatively). But I also return to an important and perennial aspect of Garber's views on body and corporeal substance that is somewhat downplayed in his most recent articles. I suggest that greater attention may lead to more interesting results than those which would be precipitated by continuing to focus on the issues that have divided Garber and his opponents up till now.

“Burchard de Volder: Crypto-Spinozist or Disenchanted Cartesian?” in Receptions of Descartes ed. T. Schmaltz (Routledge 2005), 128-46.

Abstract:
Burchard de Volder is famous as one of Leibniz's most important philosophical correspondents. In this paper I examine De Volder’s philosophical views in their own right. In doing so, I provide an illustration of one of the ways in which Descartes’ metaphysic of nature was developed by an eminent philosopher, known for his interest in natural philosophy. I also cast doubt on a claim that was put forth 15 years ago by Wim Klever and which has received recent support in Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment (OUP, 2001), namely that De Volder was one of a number of “crypto-Spinozists” who were to be found in Holland in the last quarter of the 17th Century and into the 18th Century.

“Leibniz’s Close Encounter with Cartesianism in the Correspondence with De Volder,” in Leibniz and His Correspondents ed. by P. Lodge (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 162-92.

Abstract:
Much of Leibniz's philosophy can be seen as a direct response to the views of Descartes. Sadly, there was no direct interaction between these two giants. However, one of the most important of Leibniz's correspondences, with Burchard de Volder, allows us to gain some insight into how he might have interacted with the master. In this paper I consider a number of Cartesian theses that De Volder brings to the discussion and consider the extent to which Leibniz is successful in overturning them. It is my contention that the essentials of De Volder's position remain largely unscathed by the arguments that Leibniz gives. In some ways, this is a disappointing conclusion. However, the discussion provides essential background for the reexamination of familiar passages, and for more nuanced readings of the views that Leibniz articulates. In addition, it sheds further light on a somewhat neglected question, namely the issue of why Leibniz's philosophy never had anything like the widespread acceptance of the Cartesianism that he thought he had so thoroughly discredited.

“Leibniz on Relativity and the Motion of Bodies,” Philosophical Topics 31, (2003), 277-308.

Abstract:
Leibniz argued that from the Cartesian account of motion as change of relative position it follows that individual bodies cannot be said to move. In this paper, I offer a novel reading of this argument. However, I am also concerned with the way in which Leibniz uses the argument as a platform from which he can offer his own view of bodily motion. Leibniz presents three accounts during his career. I consider all three, although the first is far less significant since it only appears once, relatively early in Leibniz's career. The received wisdom is that the remaining two discussions provide competing accounts of what is required for a body to move, the presence of which indicates a significant change in Leibniz's thinking about the issues. I argue instead that they are complementary components of a unified account of bodily motion that Leibniz adopted throughout his mature writings. The discussion sheds important light on the relationship between physics and metaphysics within Leibniz's philosophy

“Leibniz on Divisibility, Aggregates, and Cartesian Bodies,” Studia Leibnitiana 34 (2002), 59-80.

Abstract:
It is well known that Leibniz appeals to considerations of divisibility and aggregation in order to show that there is something wrong with the Cartesian conception of body. Despite the centrality of discussions of this argument in accounts of Leibniz's metaphysics, its precise nature has not been fully understood. In this paper I clarify the case that Leibniz presents and consider its force. The discussion focuses on the ways in which Leibniz presented this argument in correspondence with Arnauld and De Volder respectively. Whilst both of these philosophers defended the Cartesian view that body is extended substance, their interpretation of this differ. I argue that when the details of these accounts are uncovered it is possible to see that the argument is successful against neither.

"Leibniz, Bayle, and Locke on Faith and Reason," (with Benjamin Crowe). American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002), 576-600.

Abstract:
This paper illuminates Leibniz's conception of faith and its relationship to reason. Given Leibniz's commitment to natural religion we might expect his view of faith to be deflationary. However, we show that Leibniz's conception of faith involves a significant non-rational element. We approach the issue by considering the way in which Leibniz positioned himself between the views of two of his contemporaries, Bayle and Locke. Unlike Bayle, but like Locke, Leibniz argues that reason and faith are in conformity. However, in contrast to the account that he finds in Locke’s Essay, Leibniz does not reduce faith to a species of reasonable belief. Instead, he insists that, while faith must be grounded in reason, true or divine faith also requires a supernatural infusion of grace.

“Leibniz’s Notion of an Aggregate,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (2001), 467-86.

Abstract:
A common motif in Leibniz's later metaphysical writings is his aggregate thesis, the claim that bodies are aggregates of substances. The thesis is found as early as 1686, though exclusively in connection with the bodies of human beings. It is later extended to include the bodies of other animate beings in 1695, and, from around 1699 onward it is acknowledged with regard to all individual bodies. For this reason, a proper understanding of Leibniz’s notion of an aggregate is essential if we are to make sense of his philosophy of body more generally. In the present paper I focus exclusively on the notion of aggregate that Leibniz employs, providing an account of this category along with a critical discussion of recent interpretations that differ from mine. In section (1) I provide an inventory of the other terms that are synonymous with, or nearly synonymous with ’aggregate’. In section (2), the notion of an aggregate is analyzed, with particular attention paid to the ontological status of aggregates and the role of perception and appetition in their constitution. Here I advance an interpretation that is at odds with a view that is prominent in the current literature, and most readily associated with Donald Rutherford. Finally, in section (3) I turn to the question of whether Leibniz allows for a category of 'mereological aggregate' as well as the category whose account I have developed in previous sections. This view has been defended recently by Glenn Hartz. I argue that Hartz’s case is unpersuasive.

“Derivative and Primitive Forces in Leibnizian Bodies,” in E. Knobloch ed. Nihil Sine Ratione: Mensch, Natur und Technik im Wirken von G. W. Leibniz (2001), 720-27.

Abstract:
Leibniz distinguishes two kinds of force in bodies - primitive and derivative forces. As one might expect Leibniz holds that derivative forces are derived from primitive ones. This idea is usually expressed in terms of the notion of modification, which appears to be understood in something like the sense in which a Cartesian might have understood the relation between a shape and the extended substance in which it inheres. However, difficulties arise when we consider two other facets of Leibniz’s view. Leibniz regards the derivative forces of bodies as phenomena, namely as intentional objects of the perceptual states of monads. In contrast, primitive forces are attributes of monads in virtue of which they come to have perceptual states with such contents. It is hard to see how an intentional object could be regarded as a modification of such an attribute. I consider three approaches to solving this difficulty.

“The Debate over Extended Substance in Leibniz’s Correspondence with De Volder.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15:2 (2001), 155-65.

Abstract:
Between 1698 and 1706 Leibniz was engaged in one of his most interesting and revealing philosophical correspondences, with the Dutch philosopher and physicist Burcher de Volder. For the most part, the two men were engaged with the question of how the motion of bodies could be explained without appeal to the direct intervention of God. De Volder, though a Cartesian by training, had little sympathy with the occasionalist doctrines of later Cartesians such as Malebranche, and hoped that Leibniz might provide him with a more satisfactory account. Leibniz did have a naturalistic account of motion, but ultimately failed to live up to De Volder's expectations. I concentrate on one of the reasons for this failure here, namely the disagreement that arose between the two men over the issue of whether there is a substance whose nature is constituted by extension. Leibniz's rejection of this thesis is an essential component in the metaphysic of body that he presents. However, De Volder could not be persuaded that his own reasons for believing in extended substance were unacceptable, and nor was he persuaded by any of Leibniz's arguments against the notion.

“Leibniz’s Commitment to the Pre-established Harmony in the late 1670s and Early 1680s,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80 (1998), 292-320.

Abstract:
It has become something of a received view among contemporary scholars that Leibniz first adopted his pre-established harmony around the time of the Discourse on Metaphysics and Correspondence with Arnauld, i. e., 1686-87. More precisely, commentators seem to regard this as the point at which Leibniz self-consciously embraced the doctrine in question. In a recent paper, Christia Mercer challenges this orthodoxy. For, while it is true that Mercer does not directly contradict the received view as I have characterized it, she argues that Leibniz was committed to the doctrine, in all but name, by April 1676, some ten years before he 'adopted' it in the strong sense.

In the present paper I advocate a middle ground between these two positions. I argue that, although Mercer draws attention to some fascinating passages from Leibniz's Paris years, ultimately, these do not provide evidence that is adequate to support her thesis. Indeed, I suggest that the writings from this period of Leibniz's life do not provide evidence of consistent commitment to any account of intersubstantial causation. However, I still try to distance myself somewhat from the received view, by presenting further evidence which suggests that Leibniz became committed to the pre-established harmony sometime between 1679 and 1682. I finish with a brief discussion of why I think that evidence of such a commitment is interesting, even though it does not directly contravene the claim that Leibniz only adopted the pre-established harmony in 1686-87.

“The Failure of Leibniz’s Correspondence with De Volder,” Leibniz Society Review 8 (1998), 47- 67.

Abstract:
De Volder corresponded with Leibniz primarily in the hope that he would be provided with a naturalistic account of the causes of bodily motion. The paper considers why De Volder's hope was never fulfilled. Three major obstacles are discussed. The first is concerned with methodology, the second follows from disagreements over the nature of extension, and the third arises from Leibniz's attempts to articulate his positive views about material reality.

“Leibniz’s Heterogeneity Argument Against the Cartesian Conception of Body,” Studia Leibnitiana 30 (1998), 83-102.

Abstract:
Most of Leibniz's criticisms of the Cartesian philosophy of nature can be traced back to writings that precede the Discourse on Metaphysics. However, around 1697 a new argument appears in his writings, which I refer to as The Heterogeneity Argument. The most familiar version of this argument appears in section 13 of the paper On nature itself. According to previous commentators, Robert Adams and Daniel Garber in particular, the argument is supposed to show that that Cartesianism suffers from internal incoherence. They argue that Leibniz is trying to show that there could be no material individuals, or motion if bodies were constituted by extension alone -- features which play an essential role in the Cartesian account of nature. Thus, Leibniz presents an a priori argument to the conclusion that Cartesianism is necessarily false. By drawing on other writings from around this time, I argue that Leibniz's argument is of a different character altogether. He presents an a posteriori argument which is designed to show that the Cartesians cannot explain the contingent fact that bodies appear to be diverse.

“Stepping Back Inside Leibniz’s Mill,” with Marc Bobro. The Monist 81 (1998), 554-73.

Abstract:
The paper is a re-examination Leibniz’s famous mill argument against the materiality of mind, from Section 17 of the Monadology. After critical consideration of a number of recent interpretations by commentators such as Richard Rorty, John Searle and Margaret Wilson, the authors present an alternate reading that is more charitable and appears more faithful to Leibniz's original intentions. In particular, Leibniz is freed from the charge that he presents an obviously fallacious argument from ignorance. The article closes with a discussion of the extent to which the authors' reading of the mill argument provides a threat to contemporary materialism.

“Force and the Nature of Body in Discourse on Metaphysics §§17-18.” Leibniz Society Review 7 (1997), 116-24.

Abstract:
In paragraph 18 of the Discourse, Leibniz appears to draw a metaphysical conclusion, concerning the nature of body, from an empirical result established in DM17. I examine Robert Sleigh's account of this "inference" and present an alternate reading. The relation between DM17 and DM18 is deflated. DM17 presents an argument that aims to clear away Cartesian misconceptions about the nature of force--in particular its identification with quantity of motion'--and paves the way for metaphysical conclusions about the nature of body. However, these conclusions rely on claims made somewhat earlier in the "Discourse".

“Leibniz Microfilms at the University of Pennsylvania.” Leibniz Society Review 6 (1996), 164-69.

Abstract:
This paper provides an overview of the collection of microfilm copies of Leibniz’s manuscripts that may be found in the Van Pelt library at the University of Pennsylvania. It includes a catalogue of the Bodemann numbers of the entire collection.