What is the Ockham Society?

The Ockham Society provides a forum in which graduate students in philosophy (particularly BPhil, MSt, and PRS students) may present their ideas to their peers at the University of Oxford. Our aim is to provide every Oxford graduate student with the opportunity to present their ideas in a friendly environment at least once during their time in Oxford. It is an ideal opportunity to gain feedback on your essays, and to gain first experiences in academic presenting. Small, experimental and unfinished papers are just as welcome as more advanced ones.

If you would like to present a paper to the society please send a title and abstract of 150 words maximum to Alex Satola (alexander.satola@some.ox.ac.uk). Oxford DPhil Philosophy students are highly encouraged to present at the DPhil seminar.

Ockham Society will take place in the Colin Matthew room during Michaelmas 2022, Thursdays, 14:00-16:00.

Programme for Michaelmas 2022

Week 1
13 October
No presentation this week
Week 2
20 October
Quincy Crawford (University)
Spinoza

In Part 1 of the Ethics, Spinoza seems to argue against the reality of finite modes. Under a given attribute, any mode which follows from God's infinite essence (1p21) or from an infinite mode (1p22) must itself be infinite, and any finite mode must follow from a finite mode (1p28). Because nothing can be or be conceived without God (1p15), this implies that there are no finite modes. I defend that this argument is valid, and that Spinoza actually has good reason to reject the reality of finite modes given his view that existence facts are explicable: the disparate natures of finite modes, on the one hand, and God, on the other, prevent the former from being caused by, or following from, the latter. I then present my own, analogous argument against the reality of infinite modes, and conclude by considering this view's implications for Spinoza's account of modes and attributes more generally.

Week 3
27 October
No presentation this week
Week 4
3 November
Lara Scheibli (St Edmund's Hall)
The Moral Theory of Susanna Newcombe

This essay proposes an original interpretation of the moral theory put forward by Susanna Newcome, a much-understudied early modern philosopher, in her 'Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion' (first ed. published in 1728, 2nd edition in 1732). In doing so, the essay adds to the existing literature, in particular to Connolly's (2021) first interpretation of Newcome as an early utilitarian thinker.

I argue that we can charitably read Newcome's moral theory contained within the 'Enquiry' as utilitarian when taking into account the interaction between her theology, in particular her commitments regarding the characteristics of God and a world created by God, and her moral theory.

Week 5
10 November
Hermann Koerner
"Unless one calls the good 'belonging' ..." - Oikeion and Agathon in Plato's Symposium

I argue that Diotima's engagement with Aristophanes in the Symposium should not be understood as an outright dismissal, but as a reappraisal of his central concept of the oikeion (what 'belongs' or 'is proper' to us). Desire for the good for Plato always aims at what most properly belongs to us. Aristophanes confuses the dependence relation between oikeion and agathon when he suggests that his object of desire is good for us because it belongs to us. Yet his claim that eros leads us to the oikeion and restores our original nature (archaia phusis) unwittingly expresses a deep Platonic truth about the nature of desire.

Week 6
17 November
Isaac Hadfield
TBC

Week 7
24 November
Luca Marsico (St Peter's)
Heidegger and the Philosophy of Technology

TBC

Week 8
1 December
Nik Land (St Hugh's)
Heidegger's Kant Interpretation

TBC

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