Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948
Session 4:
The Second Round of Fighting
Inter-Arab
rivalries re-emerged with renewed vigor during the truce. As far as King
‘Abdullah was concerned, the war was over. He began to lobby in the Arab world
for the incorporation of what was left of Arab Palestine into his kingdom. He
made no secret of his view that the resumption of the war would be disastrous
to the Arabs. His solution, however, was unacceptable to any of the other
members of the Arab coalition. Syria and Lebanon saw ‘Abdullah as a permanent threat to
their independence, while King Faruq saw him as a growing menace to Egypt's hegemony in the Arab world. Count
Folke Bernadotte, the UN mediator, omitted all reference to the UN partition plan,
and proposed the partition of mandatory Palestine between Israel and Transjordan. ‘Abdullah could have hardly asked for
more but since the Arab League and Israel rejected Bernadotte's proposals out of
hand, he saw no point in going out on a limb by publicly accepting them.
Having
failed to promote a settlement of the Palestine problem, Bernadotte proposed the
extension of the truce that was due to expire on 9 July. Once again, Transjordan found itself in a minority of one in
the Arab League. All the Arab military leaders pointed to the gravity of their
supply positions but the politicians voted not to renew the truce. To deal with
the difficulty of resuming hostilities when their arsenals were depleted, the
Arab politicians settled on a defensive strategy of holding on to existing
positions. ‘Abdullah suspected that the decision was taken with the sinister
intention of undermining his diplomatic strategy and embroiling his army in a
potentially disastrous war with the Israelis. He therefore summoned Count
Bernadotte to Amman to express his extreme unease at the
prospect of war breaking out afresh and to urge him to use the full power of
the UN to bring about a reversal of the Arab League's warlike decision. But the
Egyptians pre-empted by attacking on 8 July, thereby ending the truce and
committing the Arab side irreversibly to a second round of fighting.
If
‘Abdullah was against a second round of fighting, Glubb Pasha was even more
reluctant to be drawn in as his army had only four contact days' worth of
ammunition and no replenishments in sight. Indeed, in the second round, the
Arab Legion only reacted when it was attacked. When hostilities were resumed,
the IDF quickly seized the initiative on the central front with Operation
Danny. In the first phase the objective was to capture Lydda and Ramla; in the
second it was to open a wide corridor to Jerusalem by capturing Latrun and Ramallah. All
these towns had been assigned to the Arab state and fell within the perimeter
held by the Arab Legion. On 12 July, Israeli forces captured Lydda and Ramla
and forced their inhabitants to flee eastwards. In Latrun, on the other hand,
the Israeli offensive was repulsed as was the last minute attempt to capture
the Old City of Jerusalem.
The
ALA, the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, and
Lebanese armies all suffered some reverses in the course of the second round of
fighting. The IDF offensive in the north culminated in the capture of Nazareth and in freeing the entire Lower Galilee from enemy forces. On the other hand,
the attempt to eject the Syrians from the salient at Mishmar Hayarden was not
successful and the fighting ended in stalemate. Israel's overall position improved
appreciably as a result of the 10 days of fighting. Israel seized the initiative and was to
retain it until the end of the war.
The
second UN truce came into force on 18 July and, unlike the first truce, it was
of indefinite duration. As soon as the guns fell silent, Arab politicians
resumed the war of words against one another. The line that the Arab Legion was
being prevented from using its full strength against the Jews, both through the
treachery of the British officers and the withholding of supplies by the
British government, was actively propagated by the Syrian and Iraqi officers
and by ‘Azzam Pasha. The Iraqi army officers operating in Transjordan were particularly hostile to the
British who served in the Arab Legion. The suspicion that Glubb was secretly
working to impose on the Arabs London's policy of partition accounted for the
virtual breakdown of the relations between the two Hashemite armies and for the
Iraqi branch jealously guarding its freedom of action.
Lull
in the storm
During
the lull in the storm ‘Abdullah kept flirting with the idea of bilateral
negotiations with Israel to settle the Palestine problem. Though it did not go as
planned, the war had served its basic purpose in enabling him to occupy the
central areas of Arab Palestine. Not only was there nothing else to be gained
from an appeal to arms, but such an appeal could jeopardize both his
territorial gains and his army, the mainstay of his regime and his only defense
against his Arab opponents. Accordingly, he shifted his attention from the
military to the political arena.
The
Israelis had their own reason for wanting to resume direct contact with their
old friend. Disunity in the Arab camp gave them considerable room for
manoeuver. The Arabs had marched into Palestine together but as they sustained
military reverses, each country looked increasingly to its own needs. Each
country was licking its wounds and was in no position and in no mood to help
the others or to subordinate its interests to the common cause. Under these
circumstances, anyone looking for cracks in the wall of Arab unity could easily
find them. Israel, with the memory of its military
victories still fresh in everybody's mind, was well placed to play off the
Arabs against one another. This was the background of the renewal of contact
with King ‘Abdullah's emissaries in September 1948.
Rumors
that ‘Abdullah was once again in contact with the Jewish leaders further
damaged his standing in the Arab world. His many critics suggested that he was
prepared to compromise the Arab claim to the whole of Palestine as long as he could acquire part of Palestine for himself. "The internecine
struggles of the Arabs," reported Glubb, "are more in the minds of
the Arab politicians than the struggle against the Jews. ‘Azzam Pasha, the
mufti and the Syrian government would sooner see the Jews get the whole of Palestine than that King ‘Abdullah should
benefit."
To
thwart ‘Abdullah's ambition, the other members of the Arab League, led by
Egypt, decided in Alexandria on 6 September to approve the establishment of an
Arab government for the whole of Palestine with a seat in Gaza. This was too
little and too late. The desire to placate public opinion, critical of the Arab
governments for failing to protect the Palestinians, was a major consideration.
The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the feeble attempt to create
armed forces under its control, furnished the members of the Arab League with
the means of divesting themselves of direct responsibility for the prosecution
of the war and of withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular
outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived
by its Egyptian sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to
‘Abdullah and serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate
the Arab regions with Transjordan.
But
the contrast between the pretensions of the All-Palestine Government and its
capability quickly reduced it to the level of farce. It claimed jurisdiction
over the whole of Palestine, yet it had no administration, no
civil service, no money, and no real army of its own. Even in the small enclave
around the town of Gaza its writ ran only by the grace of the
Egyptian authorities. Taking advantage of the new government's dependence on
them for funds and protection, the Egyptian paymasters manipulated it to
undermine ‘Abdullah's claim to represent the Palestinians in the Arab League
and in international forums. Ostensibly the embryo for an independent
Palestinian state, the new government, from the moment of its inception, was
thus reduced to the unhappy role of a shuttlecock in the ongoing power struggle
between Cairo and Amman.
Israel was content to see the rift develop
inside the Arab League but prudently refrained from expressing any opinion in
public for or against the All-Palestine Government. Before the Provisional
State Council, on 23 September 1948, foreign minister Moshe Sharett
described what remained of Arab Palestine as a "geographical
expression" rather than a political entity. There were two candidates for
ruling this part of Palestine: the mufti and King ‘Abdullah. In
principle, said Sharett, Israel had to prefer a separate government in
the Arab part to a merger with Transjordan; in practice, they preferred a merger
with Transjordan though their public posture was one of
neutrality. In practice, Israel also took advantage of the renewed
contacts with ‘Abdullah in order to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian
state and expand the territory of the Jewish state. As Yaacov Shimoni, the
deputy head of the Middle East Department in the Foreign Ministry, candidly
confessed:
Sharett
knew that we had agreed with ‘Abdullah that he will take and annex the Arab
part of Palestine and Sharett could not support this
ludicrous, impotent, and abortive attempt made by the Egyptians against
‘Abdullah. This attempt had nothing to do with us. It was a tactical move by
‘Abdullah's enemies to interject something against his creeping annexation. At
that time there was no annexation. Formal annexation only occurred in April 1950.
But he had started taking and preparing for annexation. So they tried, without
any success, to build a countervailing force.
The
second point is that at that time Sharett and our men knew what the powerful
State of Israel has forgotten in recent years. He understood the meaning of
diplomacy and knew how to conduct it. Sharett was definitely aware that
publicly we were obliged to accept the Palestinian Arab state and could not say
that we were opposed to the establishment of such a state. In the first place,
we had accepted the UN resolution which included a Palestinian Arab state.
Secondly, this was the right, fair, and decent course and we were obliged to
agree to it. The fact that below the surface, behind the curtain, by diplomatic
efforts, we reached an agreement with ‘Abdullah--an agreement which had not
been uncovered but was kept secret at that time--was entirely legitimate but we
did not have to talk about it. Sharett knew that our official line had to be in
favour of a Palestinian state if the Palestinians could create it. We could not
create it for them. But if they could create it, certainly, by all means, we
would agree. The fact that he made a deal with ‘Abdullah on the side to prevent
the creation of such a state, that is diplomacy, that is alright. Sharett
behaved in accordance with the rules of diplomacy and politics that are
accepted throughout the world.
Session 3
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Session 5