Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948

Session 5: 

The War Against Egypt

The rivalries among the Arab states that gave rise to the so-called Government of All-Palestine complicated Israel's diplomacy but simplified its strategy. David Ben-Gurion, the man in charge of grand strategy, was constantly on the look-out for divisions and fissures in the enemy camp that might be used to extend Israel's territorial gains. Arab disunity provided the strategic luxury of fighting a war on only one front at a time and the front Ben-Gurion chose to renew the war was the southern front. In early October he asked the General Staff to concentrate the bulk of its forces in the south and to prepare a major offensive to expel the Egyptian army from the Negev. In view of the worsening relations between Egypt and ‘Abdullah, he thought it unlikely that the Arab Legion would intervene in such a war.

On 15 October, the IDF broke the truce and launched Operation Yoav to expel the Egyptian forces from the Negev. In a week of fighting, the Israelis captured Beersheba and Bayt Jibrin, and surrounded an Egyptian brigade (which included Major Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir) in Faluja. As Ben-Gurion expected, Transjordan remained neutral in the war between Israel and Egypt. The Arab Legion was in a position to intervene to help the Egyptian brigade trapped in the Faluja pocket but it was directed instead to take Bethlehem and Hebron, which had previously been occupied by the Egyptians. ‘Abdullah and Glubb were apparently happy to see the Egyptian army defeated and humiliated.

The formation of the Government of All-Palestine revived the mufti's Holy War Army--Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas. This irregular army endangered Transjordan's control in Arab Palestine. The Transjordan government therefore decided to nip in the bud the challenge posed by this army to its authority. On 3 October, the Minister of Defense laid down that all armed bodies operating in the areas controlled by the Arab Legion were either to be under its orders or disbanded. Glubb carried out this order promptly and ruthlessly. Suspecting that Arab officers would balk at performing such an unpatriotic task, he sent British officers to surround and forcibly disband the Holy War Army. The operation brought the Arabs to the brink of internecine war when they were supposed to be cooperating against the common enemy. But it effectively neutralized the military power of ‘Abdullah's Palestinian rivals. Against this background, the Israeli attack on the Egyptian army was not altogether unwelcome. Glubb privately expressed the hope that the Jewish offensive "may finally knock out the Gaza government and give the gyppies [sic] a lesson!" In a letter to Colonel Desmond Goldie, the British commander of the First Brigade, Glubb explained that "if the Jews are going to have a private war with the Egyptians and the Gaza government, we do not want to get involved. The gyppies and the Gaza government are almost as hostile to us as the Jews!"

The Israelis followed up their "private war" in the south by launching a major offensive in the north. Israel's enemies were now being picked off one by one. On 29 October, Operation Hiram unfolded, resulting in the capture of central Galilee and in the displacement of many more Arabs. The "cleansing of the Galilee" was the result of high-level policy rather than a random by-product of the war. Central Galilee contained a large number of Arab residents, including refugees from western and eastern Galilee. On 26 September, Ben-Gurion had told the cabinet that, should the fighting be renewed in the north, the Galilee would become "clean" and "empty" of Arabs. In the event, it was Israel that renewed the fighting, and it was the IDF that carried out the expulsions. Four brigades were concentrated in the north for Operation Hiram. In four days of fighting they pushed the Syrians further east, caught Qawuqji's Arab Liberation Army in a pincer movement and knocked it out of the fight, and banished the Lebanese army from the Galilee. In hot pursuit of the retreating forces, the Carmeli Brigade crossed into Lebanon and captured 14 villages which were later relinquished when the armistice agreement was signed. Thus, on the northern front, too, the tide turned dramatically and menacingly against the Arabs.

The third UN truce came into force on 31 October. On 22 December Israel once again broke the truce by launching a second offensive in the south. The objective of Operation Horev was to complete the destruction of the Egyptian forces, to drive them out of Palestine, and to compel the Egyptian government to negotiate an armistice. Conflict between the Arab states and lack of coordination between their armies in Palestine gave Israel the freedom to choose the time and place of the second offensive. Egypt appealed to its Arab allies for help but its appeals fell on deaf ears. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen all promised assistance but failed to honor their promises. The Iraqis shelled a few Israeli villages near their front line as a token of solidarity with their embattled ally. Without exception the Arab states were either afraid to intervene or did not wish to intervene. The Israeli troops surged forward, expelled the Egyptians from the south-western flank of the Negev, and penetrated into Sinai to the outskirts of El-Arish. Operation Horev succeeded in compelling Egypt, the strongest Arab state with the best claim to lead the others, to open armistice negotiations with the state of Israel and thus to bring the war to an end. On 7 January 1949, the UN-decreed cease-fire went into force marking the formal end of the first Arab-Israeli war.

Session 4                                                                                                                           back to seminar series                                                                                                                Session 6