Weeks 1 and 2: Accounts of well-being
Mill says that “by happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain”. One of utilitarianism's intuitive attractions is the idea that happiness or well-being is ultimately what matters morally. But does Mill’s understanding of happiness as pleasure and the absence of pain do justice to that intuitive motivation? Don’t things other than pain and pleasure contribute to happiness and well-being? If so, shouldn’t they too be included in the account of utility that is at the foundation of utilitarianism? In our first two weeks, we review some alternatives and ask whether Mill should have adopted one of them instead.
Week 1 tasks (Hide)
Please prepare a short written answer to each of the following questions. These questions ask you to work out what’s going on, philosophically, in Mill’s text and elsewhere. Next week we’ll focus more on critical assessment:
- What should we understand by ‘welfare’? Why does Crisp prefer to use that term rather than ‘utility’?
- What is the relation between something’s being good for you and its being morally good, on Mill’s view?
- What is hedonism about welfare, as opposed to hedonism about motivation?
- What is Bentham’s account of welfare? What is the hedonic (felicific) calculus, and how would it measure welfare? Make use of some of the following terms in your answer: ‘symmetrical’; ‘commensurable’; ‘cardinal’; ‘continuous’; ‘quantitative’.
- How is Crisp’s example of Hadyn and the Oyster supposed to show that Bentham’s account of welfare is implausible? Does Mill make the same point in some other way?
- What is Mill’s solution to problems with the Benthamite conception of welfare?
- Mill is sometimes said to think that no amount of a lower pleasure is sufficient to outweigh any amount of a higher pleasure. From which part of the text of Utilitarianism do people get this idea? Is that the only possible interpretation of the relevant words?
- What do desire-satisfaction accounts of welfare say?
- What do ‘objective list’ accounts of welfare say?
- Is Mill’s a hedonist, desire-satisfaction, or objective-list conception of welfare, in your judgment? Why
- What is the difference between an explanatory and an enumerative account of welfare?
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Week 2 tasks (Hide)
Please prepare a short written answer to each of the following questions:
- Does Crisp’s example of Haydn and the Oyster succeed in making the point it is supposed to make? What might someone say who thought it failed?
- Consider the ‘experience machine’ thought experiment. Is the question at issue whether we would or whether it would be better (or at least no worse) for us to plug into it? What is the answer supposed to be, and what is this supposed to show?
- Why might one prefer hedonism to an objective-list account despite the objection from the experience machine thought experiment?
- Why might one prefer a desire-satisfaction account to hedonism?
- Why might one prefer a desire-satisfaction account to an objective-list account?
- A simple desire-satisfaction account simply says that one’s life goes better to the extent that more of one’s desires are satisfied. There are obvious objections to a simple account, consisting in examples of satisfactions of desires that don’t make the desirer’s life better. Can you give one?
- More sophisticated desire-satisfaction accounts avoid the objections to the simple account by giving more sophisticated, restricted specifications of the desires whose satisfaction is said to make one’s life go better. But more sophisticated specifications tend to provoke more sophisticated versions of the same objection, which provokes more sophisticated specifications, and so on. Where does this process end? Critics suggest that the process leads somewhere that undermines the appeal of desire-satisfaction theories in the first place. Why?
- Complete the following table:
| Hedonism | Desire-satisfaction | Objective-list |
---|
Enumeration | | | | Explanation | | | |
- Crisp thinks Mill is a hedonist. Brink thinks Mill is not a hedonist. (Neither thinks Mill is a desire-satisfaction theorist.) Whose interpretation is more persuasive, and why?
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Priority reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998), chs. 1–2, 4
On Mill's view in particular
- Roger Crisp, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook on Utilitarianism (Routledge, 1997), chs. 2–3
In chapter 2, Crisp places Mill’s remarks on happiness in historical context as a response to doubts about Bentham’s hedonism, and then discusses Mill’s distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures, defending it from some objections and arguing for its compatibility with a kind of hedonism that Crisp attributes to Mill. Chapter 3 begins with a version of Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ example and then proceeds to discuss the plausibility of an ‘experience requirement’ on contributors to welfare, desire-satisfaction accounts of welfare, and objective list accounts of welfare (he calls these ‘broad ideal’ accounts).
- David O. Brink, ‘Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism’, Philosophy & Public Affairs vol. 21, no. 1 (1992), pp. 68–84
Making some useful distinctions along the way, Brink argues for interpreting Mill as an objectivist and an anti-hedonist about happiness, contrary to standard readings of Utilitarianism. Brink's discussion offers a good example of some key scholarly virtues, such as defending one's interpretation of one part of a text by showing how it helps to make sense of another.
- Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy (Cornell, 1991), chapters 2–3
Donner offers an interpretation of Mill’s complex hedonism and then pits hedonism against desire-satisfaction views, arguing that it acquits itself well.
On accounts of well-being more generally
- Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 493–502
Parfit distinguishes three kinds of theory about what makes a person's life go well: hedonistic theories, desire-fulfilment theories, and objective list theories, and surveys some objections and refinements to the theories.
- James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford, 1988), chs. 1–2
Griffin does not talk much about hedonism, but offers detailed analysis and development (via response to objections) of desire accounts of well-being.
- Roger Crisp, ‘Hedonism Reconsidered’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research vol. 73, no. 3 (2006)
Distinguishing between ‘enumerative’ and ‘explanatory’ conceptions of theories of well-being, Crisp makes a case for explanatory hedonism, understood as the view that enjoyed experiences make life good for the subject because they share the characteristic of feeling good. He defends it from important objections from the heterogeneity of enjoyable experiences, the difference between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ pleasures, and the experience machine.
- Guy Fletcher, ‘A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being’, Utilitas vol. 25, no. 2 (2013)
Making a number of useful distinctions along the way, Fletcher clarifies the relations between objective-list, hedonist, and desire-fulfilment theories of well-being. He then defends his own objective list account, arguing in particular that it captures the main attraction of the leading rival, desire-fulfilment theory.
- Gwen Bradford, ‘Problems for Perfectionism’, Utilitas (2016)
Bradford defends perfectionism—the theory that well-being consists in the development of characteristically human capacities—from the objection that it fails to capture the relevance of the subject’s own preferences and enjoyment, and from the objection that it valorises the development of capacities that it is intuitively not good for a person to develop. She then suggests that a deeper problem for perfectionists is to show that perfectionism not only unifies the list of capacities that are said to be good to develop, but explains why it is good to develop them. She argues that several possible responses to the deeper problem are inadequate, but concludes that since rival theories of well-being face the same problem, perfectionism is at no comparative disadvantage.
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Further reading (Hide)
- Connie S. Rosati, ‘Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good’, Ethics vol. 105, no. 2 (1995)
Rosati discusses ‘ideal adviser’ theories of well-being, according to which what is good for a person is what a fully-informed counterpart would advise or desire. She argues that the source of an ideal adviser’s authority as an adviser is undermined by the nature of the changes that she undergoes in becoming fully informed as ideal adviser accounts conceive this. She also casts doubt on the coherence of the notion of full information that is invoked by defenders of ideal adviser accounts.
- Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford, ), ch. 4
- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), ch. 3
- Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 493–502
- Elizabeth Anderson, ‘John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living’, Ethics vol. 102, no. 1 (1991)
- T.M. Scanlon, ‘Value, Desire, and Quality of Life’, in his The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge, 2003)
- Amartya Sen, ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’, Journal of Philosophy vol. 76, no. 9 (1979)
- Christopher Heathwood, ‘Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism’, Philosophical Studies vol. 128, no. 3 (2005)
- L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford, 1999), chs. 1, 4–5
- Shelly Kagan, ‘The Limits of Well-Being’, Social Philosophy & Policy vol. 9, no. 2 (1992)
- Krister Bykvist, Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Continuum, 2010), ch. 4
- Christopher Heathwood, ‘The Problem of Defective Desires’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 83, no. 4 (2005)
- Fred Feldman, ‘The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research vol. 65, no. 3 (2002)
- Serena Olsaretti, ‘The limits of hedonism: Feldman on the value of attitudinal pleasure’, Philosophical Studies vol. 136, no. 3 (2007)
- Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986), chapter 12
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Week 3: The ‘proof’ of the principle of utility
In Chapter 4 of Utilitarianism, Mill gives what has come to be known as his ‘proof’ of the Principle of Utility. Our aim this week is to arrive at a clear understanding of what (if anything) Mill is trying to prove, what sort of proof he aims to give and how it is supposed to work, and what we should think about it.
This week’s tasks (Hide)
Please EITHER write an essay on the following question How is Mill’s ‘proof’ supposed to work? Does it succeed? OR prepare a short written answer to each of the following questions:
- Chapter 4 of Utilitarianism defends the ‘Principle of Utility’. What does this say? (Clue: be careful not to confuse the Principle of Utility with utilitarianism, the moral theory.)
- The argument for the Principle of Utility is often analysed into three distinct steps. What are those steps (not the arguments for them—just the steps themselves)? (Each step will just be a simple claim, like “Flytipping is anti-social” or “Pleasure is valuable” or “People like berries”.)
- What is the argument for step 1? (That is, what reason(s) does Mill give for thinking that the claim that constitutes step 1 is true?)
- What is the argument for step 2?
- What is the argument for step 3?
- Take any of the three steps and the argument for it you’ve just identified. Can you identify one objection to the argument? An objection might take the form of a counterexample, or highlighting that some consideration doesn’t actually support a claim it’s alleged to support, or pointing out an alternative explanation of something that’s more compelling than the one the argument relies on, for instance.
- What could someone concerned to patch up Mill’s argument—that is, to secure the same conclusion and by appeal to broadly the same considerations but without falling foul of your objection—say in response to your objection?
- Would the steps of the patched-up argument be different? If so, write them down.
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Priority reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998), chs. 1–2, 4
- Roger Crisp, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook on Utilitarianism (Routledge, 1997), pp. 67–90
Crisp offers a clear analysis and reconstruction of Mill’s ‘proof’, together with some helpful background and discussion of the limitations of Mill’s argument as Crisp interprets it.
- Everett W. Hall, ‘The “Proof” of Utility in Bentham and Mill’, Ethics vol. 60, no. 1 (1949), pp. 1–18 (skip pp. 14–16 on Bentham). Reprinted in J.B. Schneewind (ed.), Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays (Palgrave Macmillan, 1968)
Hall defends Mill from the charge that the ‘proof’ commits a number of fallacies. Don’t worry too much about the details of the various fallacies that the article discusses; focus on Hall’s careful readings of passages from Utilitarianism. You should try to emulate this kind of attention to detail, but not Hall’s scornful tone!
- Henry R. West, ‘Mill’s “Proof” of the Principle of Utility’, in Henry R. West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell, 2006)
West briefly defends Mill against the accusations that he commits the fallacies of equivocation and composition. He spends more time attempting to reconcile the hedonistic account of happiness he attributes to Mill with the step in Mill’s ‘proof’ in which Mill says that other things, such as music and virtue, are parts of happiness.
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Further reading (Hide)
- David Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford, 2013), ch. 5
- James Seth, ‘The Alleged Fallacies in Mill’s “Utilitarianism”’, The Philosophical Review vol. 17, no. 5 (1908), pp. 469–488
- D. Daiches Raphael, ‘Fallacies in and about Mill’s “Utilitarianism”’, Philosophy vol. 30, no. 115 (1955), pp. 344–357
- Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ‘Mill’s “Proof” of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted Defense’, Social Philosophy & Policy vol. 18, no. 2 (2001), pp. 330–360
- Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (University of California Press, 1984), chs. 1–2
- Krister Bykvist, Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Continuum, 2010), ch. 2
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Week 4: Integrity and Alienation
The utilitarian moral requirement of utility-maximisation looks straightforwardly very demanding, at least in the sense that it appears to call for large sacrifices of resources on the part of those who have many. Critics of utilitarianism have also argued that it is demanding in other senses: it alienates people from one another, from their relationships, from their deepest commitments, and from morality itself. Indeed, many claim that it is too demanding to be plausible, and reject it for that reason. This week, we consider and evaluate some of these arguments.
This week’s tasks (Hide)
Please EITHER write an essay on the following question Is utilitarianism too demanding? Is it alienating? Does it threaten agents’ integrity? Are any of these decisive objections to it? OR prepare a short written answer to each of the following questions:
- Act utilitarianism may be said to be very demanding in at least three different senses: in that it requires us to give away a lot of our time and resources; in that doing as it requires is incompatible with genuine friendship and other valuable relationships; and in that doing as it requires is incompatible with ‘integrity’. Provide three examples, each illustrating a different one (and just one) of these ways in which it might be thought to be too demanding. Make sure that these examples make it clear that the problem lies in the fact that utilitarianism requires certain courses of action.
- Consider the concern about the compatibility of act utilitarianism and valuable relationships. Railton proposes a response on behalf of utilitarians. What is it? How does it differ from rule utilitarianism?
- Kapur thinks that Railton’s response fails. Why? Is the alleged failure supposed to show that even a sophisticated utilitarianism such as Railton’s will require us to do things that are incompatible with friendship, or something else?
- Now consider the concern about integrity. What, precisely, is Williams’s complaint? How (if at all) does the complaint differ from the one about giving up time and resources and the one about valuable relationships?
- Is Williams merely begging the question by assuming the truth of ‘common-sense’ deontological (duty-based) morality and then objecting to utilitarianism for requiring acts that common-sense morality doesn’t require?
- Donner suggests that Williams is pandering to a kind of narcissism. What does she have in mind? Is this fair to Williams?
- Ashford seems to agree that utilitarianism can be a threat to agents’ integrity, and yet not that this is a problem for utilitarianism. Why?
- At the end of her paper, Ashford considers something like the problem that Kapur raises. What is her response? Is it persuasive? Why (or why not)?
- Look over your answers to the preceding questions. Some of them (should) include, either implicitly or explicitly, assessments you’ve made of the strength of objections to utilitarianism and of replies to those objections. On the basis of those assessments alone, does it appear that utilitarianism is in some way too demanding to be plausible (=likely to be true), or not? NB. Don’t answer this on the basis of an overall impression, but simply on the basis of whether or not any of the objections you’ve considered are both powerful if successful and (at least as far as what you’ve written indicates) successful (that is, unanswered or only inadequately answered).
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Priority reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998), chs. 2–3, 5
- Bernard Williams, ‘A critique of utilitarianism’, sections 3–5, in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press, 1973)
Williams argues that utilitarianism’s commitment to a doctrine of ‘negative responsibility’ (which he interprets as an extreme form of impartiality) generates deep problems for it, which he illustrates with two famous examples. In particular, Williams accuses utilitarianism of mounting an attack on agents’ integrity.
- Wendy Donner, ‘Mill’s utilitarianism’, in John Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 287–9
Donner defends Mill against objections to the way it handles dilemmas such as those described by Williams, arguing that it appropriately eschews the moral narcissism of those who are lucky enough to be in “privileged sanctuaries”.
- Elizabeth Ashford, ‘Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality’, The Journal of Philosophy vol. 97, no. 8 (2000)
Ashford replies to Williams’s ‘integrity’ critique of utilitarianism. She begins by arguing that the integrity that matters must be appropriately sensitive to real moral considerations. Then she argues that the present ‘emergency situation’ of the world generates demands that conflict with the integrity that matters even on Williams’s own account of our moral obligations, as well as other non-consequentialist accounts, and that it is a virtue of utilitarianism that it explicitly acknowledges the conflict. She ends by defending utilitarianism from the charge that even in ideal conditions, it would threaten agents’ integrity.
- Peter Railton, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs vol. 13, no. 2 (1984)
Railton considers examples of ‘alienation’ in which something important seems to be missing from people's attitudes to their loved ones, and asks how a commitment to morality can avoid engendering this sort of alienation. Drawing on a solution to the ‘paradox of hedonism’, he distinguishes between criterion of right and decision procedure, and defends a ‘sophisticated consequentialist’ view according to which the appropriate decision procedure may be non-consequentialist. This, he suggests, need not be alienating. Railton also responds more directly to Williams’s critique, and ends with some reflection on meaningfulness in life and its significance for questions about morality‘s demandingness.
- Neera Badhwar Kapur, ‘Why It Is Wrong to be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship’, Ethics vol. 101, no. 3 (1991)
Badhwar argues that any plausible theory of morality must be compatible with what she calls ‘end friendship’, and suggests that even Railton-style sophisticated consequentialism is fundamentally incompatible with end friendship. The key idea is that end friendship requires us to justify our attitudes to our friends in a certain way, and not just to have those attitudes. More generally, Badhwar argues that friendship is itself intrinsically moral in a way that consequentialism cannot make sense of.
- Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, revised edition (Oxford, 1994), pp. 1–22, 55–70
In the first extract, Scheffler clarifies the nature and appeal of consequentialism and distinguishes two non-consequentialist conceptions of morality, one of which (the ‘hybrid conception’) he defends in the book as a whole. He proceeds to describe two important objections to consequentialism, Williams’s ‘integrity’ objection and a distributive justice-based objection, before giving more details of the hybrid conception that he thinks avoids the objections. That conception includes an ‘agent-centred prerogative’ to assign greater weight to one’s own interests than to those of others. After discussing alternative responses to the integrity objection in the pages preceding the second extract, Scheffler defends the agent-relative prerogative in that extract by appeal to the independence of the personal point of view and the need for an adequate moral theory to reflect it.
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Further reading (Hide)
- Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Harvard, 1993), pp. 161–2
- Roger Crisp, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook on Utilitarianism (Routledge, 1997), ch. 6
- Sarah Conly, ‘Utilitarianism and Integrity’, The Monist vol. 66, no. 2 (1983)
- Cheshire Calhoun, ‘Standing for Something’, in her Moral Aims (Oxford, 2016)
- Dean Cocking, and Justin Oakley, ‘Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation’, Ethics vol. 106, no. 1 (1995)
- Elinor Mason, ‘Can an Indirect Consequentialist Be a Real Friend? ’, Ethics vol. 108, no. 2 (1998)
- Samuel Scheffler, ‘Introduction’, in Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1988
- Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1989), ch. 10
- Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, 1998), Introduction and Part 5
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Week 5: Justice
Another widespread concern about utilitarianism has to do with justice. In the most general sense, justice concerns what is due to people, what they have a right to, and it is taken to be of fundamental moral importance. Notoriously, utilitarianism seems to have no place for rights, which it seems to disregard at least insofar as they stand in the way of maximising utility. Mill devotes the rich fifth chapter of Utilitarianism to this subject, giving an analysis of the concepts of morality in general and justice in particular before arguing that utilitarians can make sense of the priority of justice. This week, we review the objections from justice and consider utilitarian responses.
This week’s tasks ( Hide)
Please EITHER write an essay on the following question What problems does justice pose for utilitarianism? Can utilitarians solve them? OR prepare a short written answer to each of the following questions:
- Mill has an account of what (we think) makes an act a matter of moral requirement, and an account of what makes an act a matter of justice. How does he characterise morality? How does he characterise justice? How does justice relate to morality, on Mill's account?
- How are rights related to duties according to the Hohfeldian schema set out by Kamm?
- Rights are standardly taken to be constraints on the pursuit of other ends. How are they supposed to constrain that pursuit?
- Why does it look as if rights pose a problem for utilitarians? (An illustration would help.)
- Mill thinks that we have rights, and that these can be justified. How?
- Why might this justification seem unsatisfactory?
- Defences of Mill on justice tend to give a role to rules in utilitarianism, but they don’t all give the same role to rules. What role does Sumner give them? What role does Lyons give them? How do they differ?
- Does the role that Sumner gives to rules in his account of Mill’s utilitarianism form the basis of a persuasive defence of Mill in the face of the problem that rights seem to pose? Why (or why not?) (NB. A persuasive defence will both be recognisably something that Mill might have thought—at the very least a natural elaboration of things he already clearly thinks, if not explicitly stated or suggested by the text—and at least somewhat plausible in its own right.)
- Does the role that Lyons gives to rules in his account of Mill’s utilitarianism form the basis of a persuasive defence of Mill in the face of the problem that rights seem to pose? Why (or why not?)
- If you have answered that Sumner’s and Lyons’s proposals each form the basis a persuasive defence of Mill, give a reason to prefer one defence over the other.
- Look over the answers you’ve given. These are the skeleton of an essay. To make an essay out of them, you would need to add only an introduction, a conclusion, and some ‘signposting’ to glue it all together. The conclusion would begin something like this:
“Rights seem to pose a problem for utilitarianism because [insert summary of what you said in answers 3–4 here].” If you answered that either Mill’s, Sumner’s, or Lyons’s defence is persuasive, you would then say something like “However, as I have argued, the problem can be solved by [insert summary of the successful defensive strategy here].”. If you answered that none of the defences were persuasive, you would say something like “As I have argued, various strategies for solving the problem fail. Accordingly, I conclude that the problem is fatal for utilitarianism.” (Despite what you may have heard, a conclusion shouldn’t introduce any new arguments or express an ‘overall’ impression—nothing further should be needed to persuade the reader by the time you get there!) Write your conclusion.
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Priority reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998), ch. 5
- Roger Crisp, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook on Utilitarianism (Routledge, 1997), ch. 7
Crisp sets out the arguments of chapter 5 of Utilitarianism and discusses some problems that they seem to raise for Mill, paying particular attention to the sustainability of the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations that grounds Mill’s distinction between justice and morality, and to doubts about Mill’s ability to account adequately for ideas of fairness or equity.
- F. M. Kamm, ‘Rights’, in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford, 2004)
Kamm offers a philosophically in-depth survey of various features of rights and rights theory. Concentrate on the introduction, section 1 (‘Conceptual Basics’), and section 3.1 (‘Conflicts of Rights and Goods’).
- L.W. Sumner, ‘Mill’s Theory of Rights’, in Henry R. West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell, 2006)
After a helpful summary of the analysis of rights and explaining how, in general, consequentialism looks basically incompatible with a commitment to rights, Sumner presents Mill as proposing a utilitarian justification of rights-conferring rules of thumb—a Railton-style ‘sophisticated consequentialism’.
- David Lyons, ‘Mill‘s Theory of Justice’, in Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt (Springer, 1978). Reprinted in David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (Oxford, 1994)
Lyons highlights two justice-based objections to utilitarianism. After raising some doubts about them directly, he sets out a reading of Mill’s account of morality and justice according to which Mill is not an act utilitarian but a special kind of rule utilitarian, which he thinks enables Mill to avoid the objections from justice.
- Douglas Portmore, ‘Combining Teleologial Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly vol. 86, no. 1 (2005)
Portmore proposes that an ‘agent-relative’ form of teleological ethics accommodates non-consequentialist agent-relativity in the case of constraints, special obligations, and prerogatives while preserving consequentialism's most attractive feature (the idea that it's never impermissible to bring about the best state of affairs). Hence, acceptance of constraints etc. need not commit one to non-consequentialism (or rather, to non-teleology). (The Schroeder article in the further reading is a reply to Portmore and others advocating this kind of view.)
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Further reading (Hide)
- David Lyons, ‘Benevolence and Justice in Mill’, in Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), The Limits of Utilitarianism (University of Minnesota Press, 1982). Reprinted in David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory (Oxford University Press, 1994)
- David O. Brink, Mill's Progressive Principles (Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 9
- Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom (University of California Press, 1984), ch. 4
- David Lyons, ‘Utility and Rights’, in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the Law (New York University Press, 1982). Reprinted in David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory (Oxford University Press, 1994).
- John Skropuski, John Stuart Mill (Routledge, 1990), ch. 9
- Mark Schroeder, ‘Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and “Good”’, Ethics vol. 117, no. 2 (2007)
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Week 6: Forms of utilitarianism and consequentialism
Act utilitarianism is only one possible form that utilitarianism can take. Others include multi-level utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, motive utilitarianism, sanction utilitarianism, scalar utilitarianism, and satisficing utilitarianism—some of which you have already encountered in earlier weeks. Each form has its own theoretical motivation, and each may avoid some of the objections to utilitarianism we have considered in preceding weeks. Yet some of these forms may not satisfy the motivations for utilitarianism, and adopting one as a way to avoid the objections may itself be objectionably ad hoc. This week, we consider these questions.
This week’s tasks (Hide)
This week, you’re going to write an essay in answer to the following question: “Utilitarians should defend act utilitarianism or else give up utilitarianism altogether.” Do you agree?
If you’re feeling unsure about how to do this, you can construct your essay by completing the following tasks, going back and forth between reading and working on the a task (and reading with a view to extracting what you need to complete a given task). Be ready to go back and revise what you’ve written in response to a completed task in light of what you come to think as you work on a subsequent one! NB. Don’t submit your answers to the tasks—just the essay that you write as a result of completing them all.
- Start by thinking about what we call motivating the question. Why would someone think that a utilitarian should affirm act utilitarianism or else give up utilitarianism altogether? The idea must be either that other forms of utilitarianism are hopeless, or that they’re not really utilitarian at all. So as you read the texts in the reading list, note that you’re going to want to be looking out for a reason to think every alternative form is hopeless (maybe one general reason, or maybe distinct reasons for each form), or a reason to think that alternative forms aren’t true to fundamental utilitarian ideals or commitments in the first place.
- Ask yourself: what are the fundamental utilitarian ideals or commitments? Don’t say: “utilitarians are fundamentally committed to the view that the right thing to do is that which maximises utility” (or anything that comes to the same thing)—that would just build act utilitarianism into the motivation for it. But perhaps there is some basic idea that act utilitarianism somehow embodies that (at least some) other forms don’t. What might that be?
- Now make absolutely sure you’ve understood the following distinctions:
- between single-level act utilitarianism and multi-level act utilitarianism;
- between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism (NB. this is not the same distinction as the preceding one!);
- between maximising utilitarianism and satisficing utilitarianism;
- between scalar utilitarianism and other forms of utilitarianism (including maximising and satisficing).
Write brief summaries of each distinction.
- One reason you might look for an alternative to any given form of utilitarianism is that there are objections to it that seem fatal. But some forms of utilitarianism may express ideals or commitments that are very different from the form that seems vulnerable to fatal objection. So there may be a sense in which switching from one view to another involves throwing out the baby with the bathwater. We need, then, to work out for each form of utilitarianism what the ‘baby’ is—that is, what basic ideals or commitments it expresses or reflects or elaborates. For example, scalar utilitarians are partly motivated by scepticism about the ’deontic’ aspects of widespread moral thinking. If you’re not a sceptic about those aspects, adopting scalar utilitarianism may not be a good way to avoid objections to act utilitarianism—you may be throwing out at least one baby with the bathwater.
Think of a form of utilitarianism that avoids an objection to act utilitarianism, but throws out a baby in this sense. Write a paragraph explaining this.
- Consider rule utilitarianism. What do rule utilitarians hold? Be very precise: avoid phrases such as ‘leads to’, and keep in mind that rules don’t by themselves produce or maximise anything, since they’re merely abstract objects. What motivation, what way of thinking about moral theorising might rule utilitarianism exemplify or reflect that contrasts with the way that act utilitarians think about moral theorising? (Clue: rule utilitarians might be thinking of morality as a whole as a kind of object of social scientific study.) Note that it’s a mistake to think of utilitarianism as a theory of theory choice, so one thing that’s not going on is that rule utilitarians are rule utilitarians because they think that maximises utility (whatever that would mean).
- The ‘collapse objection’ to rule utilitarianism holds that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism. Why is it supposed to collapse? Why is that supposed to be an objection?
- Look at your formulation of rule utilitarianism above. Are there elements in it that could be changed (without altering the fundamentally rule utilitarian character) so that the collapse objection wouldn’t work any more? How? Are there independent reasons to prefer any of the different versions of rule utilitarianism that such changes would yield? Again, remember that utilitarianism is not a theory of theory choice, so ‘it maximises utility’ would not be a good reason to pick one theory over another even if it made sense (as it’s not clear it does).
- Look over your answers to the questions, and then using them as material, construct an essay of under 1600 words as follows:
- Write a paragraph setting out what act utilitarians believe, and give (what you think is) a plausible fundamental ideal or commitment or idea that act utilitarianism reflects or expresses.
- Write a paragraph setting out a couple of important objections to act utilitarianism.
- Identify a form of utilitarianism that seems capable of avoiding these objections but (in your view) throws out the act-utilitarian baby with the bathwater (i.e. doesn’t reflect or express the core ideal or commitment you identified). Write a paragraph explaining to the reader that someone might be tempted to adopt this alternative as a way to avoid the objections, and then explaining why doing so would throw the baby out with the bathwater. It might be a good idea to use the baby/bathwater metaphor here, since the next paragraph will be assuming familiarity with its application to this context.
- Write (as a new paragraph) “It might be that every form of utilitarianism other than act utilitarianism throws the baby out with the bathwater in the sense that [insert name of form of utilitarianism that you discussed in paragraph just written here] does. If that is true, then act utilitarians should either stick with act utilitarianism and find act utilitarian ways to rebut the objections (or bite the bullet on them), or else abandon utilitarianism altogether.”
- Write paragraphs that either argue that this is true (you can’t cover every form of utilitarianism, but you can cover a couple of the most important, or you can give a general reason to think that only act utilitarianism retains the baby—that is, only act utilitarianism adequately reflects or expresses the fundamental ideal or commitment or idea that you identified earlier) or that it isn’t (you only need one alternative form of utilitarianism to avoid the objections and yet not throw the baby out with the bathwater for this). Keep in mind that multi-level act utilitarianism is a form of act utilitarianism!
- If and only if you have argued that it is true, write a paragraph pointing out that since there are many forms of act utilitarianism, there may still be ways for act utilitarians to avoid the objections without abandoning the core ideal, although some of these may themselves have worse problems. Give an example, and then write although that assessing this form of utilitarianism is beyond the scope of the essay, it seems at least potentially plausible. Then write a concluding paragraph that simply says something like “So, I conclude that act utilitarians should indeed defend act utiltiarianism or give up utilitarianism altogether. But this may not be as bad a prospect as some critics might think.”
- If and only if you have argued that it is not true, write a paragraph pointing out that some of the alternative forms of utilitarianism that don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater may face pretty difficult objections of their own. Set out an objection to the form of utilitarianism you identified as a non-baby-throwing-out alternative to act utilitarianism, and explain why you think proponents of this form might be able to meet it. (If you can’t do this, find another form, or go back and switch tack in the essay!) Then write a concluding paragraph that says something like “So, I conclude that utilitarians are not forced to defend act utilitarianism if they are to defend utilitarianism at all. On the contrary, they can adopt [insert the alternative form you’ve defended here], which both retains the core commitments that make act utilitarianism appealing in the first place and is defensible in its own right.”
- Finally, add an introductory paragraph at the start that merely states your conclusion and briefly summarises (just three or four sentences) the motivation you’ve identified for the question and the reasons your essay (as it has turned out) gives for its conclusion. And add any necessary signposting between paragraphs—phrases such as “Despite this appealing core commitment, utilitarianism seems vulnerable to two important objections” and “However, it’s not true that no other form of utilitarianism can command the same appeal, and for the same reasons, as act utilitarianism.”
Your essay is complete! Trim it down to 1600 words if you’ve gone over. And remember that you can adjust things as necessary in light of your developing thought. For example, you might have thought to begin with that the core appeal of utilitarianism is one thing, but as you wrote the essay come to think that it’s actually something else, and so that your argument doesn’t work. No problem! Just go back and revise and switch strategies as necessary. And don’t worry if it doesn’t feel quite right even then. Your essay is just a snapshot of your thought at one stage in its development—your best effort to articulate the truth in answer to the question at this point. It doesn’t need to be perfect, and indeed in one sense you would hope it isn’t, since otherwise you wouldn’t get much out of the tutorial.
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Priority reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998), chs. 2–3, 5
- Roger Crisp, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook on Utilitarianism (Routledge, 1997), pp. 95–124
Crisp introduces some important distinctions in utilitarian theory: between character and act utilitarianism, between actualism and probabilism, between decision-making procedure and criterion of right action, between act and rule utilitarianism (paying special attention to J.O. Urmson’s interpretation of Mill as a rule utilitarian), and between single-level and multi-level utilitarianism. Crisp defends a reading of Mill as a multi-level utilitarian before turning to discuss two objections (from demandingness and from ‘rule-worship’).
- Wendy Donner, ‘Mill’s utilitarianism’, in John Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 278–82
Donner argues that Mill is best read as neither a strict act utilitarian nor as a strict rule utilitarian, and very helpfully frames the debate in terms of what’s at stake: “whether Mill's utilitarianism can formulate rules of justice or obligation which are strong enough to withstand being easily overturned, for minor or moderate gains in utility to others, yet flexible enough to be outweighed in rare cases of catastrophe”.
- Alastair Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism’, in Henry R. West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell, 2006)
Norcross argues that the ‘all-or-nothing’ nature of the distinction between right and wrong, common to both maximising and satisficing utilitarian theories, introduces arbitrariness into these theories and fits badly with underlying utilitarian reasoning. He argues that these and the related categories of duty and obligation should be abandoned by utilitarians. He notes that adopting a scalar approach—treating utilitarianism “simply as a theory of the goodness of states of affairs and the comparative value of actions”—enables utilitarians to avoid objections from demandingness and supererogation, too.
- Brad Hooker, ‘Right, Wrong, and Rule-Consequentialism’, in Henry R. West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell, 2006)
Hooker briefly sets out rule consequentialism and then discusses two ways of arguing for it. He endorses the ‘Reflective Equilibrium’ argument for rule-consequentialism, defending it against competing consequentialist views. Then he specifies and defends a particular formulation of rule consequentialism in detail.
- Richard Arneson, ‘Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections’, Philosophical Issues vol. 15, no. 1 (2005)
Arneson argues that Hooker’s rule consequentialism cannot avoid objections relating to its recommendations for agents in circumstances of general non-acceptance of the rule-utilitarian code, to its deference to common-sense deontological distinctions, and to its dependence on intuitively irrelevant contingencies.
- Michael Ridge, ‘Introducing Variable-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 56, no. 223 (2006)
Ridge argues that rule-utilitarians can avoid major objections to standard full-compliance and partial-compliance versions of their view by adopting what he calls ‘variable-rate rule-utilitarianism’, according to which “an action is right if and only if it would be required by rules which have the following property: when you take the expected utility of every level of social acceptance between (and including) ?% and 100% for those rules, and compute the average expected utility for all of those different levels of acceptance, the average for these rules is at least as high as the corresponding average for any alternative set of rules”.
- Abelard Podgorski, ‘Wouldn’t it be Nice? Moral Rules and Distant Worlds’, Nous vol. 52, no. 2 (2018)
Using some ingenious (and funny) philosophical tools, Podgorski argues that responses to ‘ideal world’ objections to rule consequentialism, such as Ridge’s variable-rate view, that involve altered specification of the conditions under which a rule is tested fail because they don’t get at the heart of the problem, which is that they make assessment of individual acts dependent upon assessment of features of the world that may not obtain alongside the performance of that act.
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Further reading (Hide)
- R. Eugene Bales, ‘Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 3 (1971)
- R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford University Press, 1981), chs. 2–3
- Roger Crisp, ‘Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue’, The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 42, no. 167 (1992)
- Robert Merrihew Adams, ‘Motive Utilitarianism’, The Journal of Philosophy vol. 73, no. 14 (1976)
- John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, The Philosophical Review vol. 64, no. 1 (1965)
- David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Clarendon Press, 1965)
- J.J.C. Smart, ‘An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics’, section 7, and Bernard Williams, ‘A critique of utilitarianism’, section 6, in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press, 1973)
- Brad Hooker and Guy Fletcher, ‘Variable versus Fixed-Rate Rule Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 58, no. 231 (2008)
- Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume One (Oxford University Press, 2011), section 45
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Further study: Interpreting Mill
Utilitarianism is a dense and complex text, and it is not the only work of moral and political philosophy that Mill wrote. So different parts of the book and of Mill's corpus more generally may suggest different accounts of utilitarianism. Part of the art of scholarly interpretation involves trying to identify a view to attribute to an author that seems to capture the author's meaning in a plausible way, accounting for apparent inconsistencies either by explaining them away or by diagnosing their source in a way that makes them understandable. As further work, try undertaking that task in the case of Mill.
Sample essay question (Hide)
Using the scholarly, philosophical, and essay-writing techniques and skills you’ve learned over the past five weeks, (e.g. structuring your thought around questions, checking interpretations against the text, and so on) write an essay of no more than 1600 words in answer to the following question: What moral theory should we attribute to Mill?
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Priority reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998)
- J.O. Urmson, ‘The Interpretation of the Philosophy of J.S. Mill’, The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 3, no. 10 (1953)
Urmson makes a well-known case for reading Mill as a rule utilitarian, highlighting several passages that seem to support his interpretation and arguing that even the so-called ‘Proportionality Doctrine’ need not be read as act-utilitarian.
- David Lyons, ‘Mill’s Theory of Morality’, Nous vol. 10, no. 2 (1976). Reprinted in David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (Oxford, 1994)
Focusing on a passage from chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, Lyons argues powerfully against an act-utilitarian reading of Mill and defends instead an interpretation of Mill that might be described as ‘coercive-rule utilitarian’ (though Lyons describes it as a ‘sanction theory’ and others have labelled it ‘sanction utilitarianism’). He ends by discussing one or two puzzles that this interpretation gives rise to.
- Wendy Donner, ‘Mill’s utilitarianism’, in John Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 289–92
Donner argues that contemporary objections to utilitarianism are blunted by an appreciation of Mill’s conception of moral agents and and the importance to him of socialisation and self-development.
- David O. Brink, Mill's Progressive Principles (Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 4
Brink argues for an act-utilitarian reading of Mill, offering detailed analysis of the ‘Proportionality Doctrine’, Mill’s discussion of secondary principles, and chapter 5 of Utilitarianism. His argument is partly based on independent reasons for favouring act utilitarianism over sanction utilitarianism, since in his view Mill’s writings alone don’t unequivocally support one rather than the other.
- Daniel Jacobson, ‘Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill’, The Philosophical Review vol. 117, no. 2 (2008)
Taking consequentialism to be committed to ‘agent-neutrality’ and ‘deontic impartiality’, Jacobson argues for the view that Mill was not a consequentialist. Jacobson relies on evidence from On Liberty as well as from chapter 5 of Utilitarianism; his interpretation resembles Lyons’s, but makes the distinctive nature of the moral sentiments through which we compel compliance with rules more central.
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Further reading (Hide)
- J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, Book VI, ch. 12
- J.S. Mill, On Liberty
- Alan E. Fuchs, ‘Mill’s Theory of Morally Correct Action’, in Henry R. West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell, 2006)
- David Lyons, ‘Mill‘s Theory of Justice’, in Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt (Springer, 1978)
- Daniel Jacobson, ‘J.S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism’, Philosophers’ Imprint vol. 3, no. 2 (2003)
- Elizabeth Anderson, ‘John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living’, Ethics vol. 102, no. 1 (1991)
- Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (University of California Press, 1984), ch. 3
- Henry R. West, ‘Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism’, Philosophy vol. 51, no. 195 (1976)
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